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ABSTRACT 
 
While power has been thought to shape international law, we are seeing that 
international law itself has become a source of power for developing states.  This occurs as 
developing states use international law as a means to affect regional change.  Developing 
states’ reliance on international law, particularly as they form coherent foreign policy 
against a counter-colonial background, strengthens international law as a process by which 
developing states express their interests.  Gradually, this strengthening snowballs to where 
it affects change in global international law processes and, at times, can act to constrain 
powerful states from acting in ways that directly reflect their personal interests.  Indeed, 
the reliance on international law may reflect that the preservation of international law 
processes has become a shared, global interest.  This imbues international law itself with 
an unexpected form of power. 
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“The International Court of Justice represents one of the symbols of man’s belief 
in a world of law and order, a world in which might ceases to be right, and truth 
and justice prevail.”1 
 
I. Introduction 
 
At its root, this report is an inquiry into power.  International law is an independent 
source of power that may operate to coerce a stronger state to act against its own interests.  
Recent events suggest that international law, a paragon of liberal virtues, may be in 
decline.2  Several states have threatened to leave the International Criminal Court;3 Russia 
arguably violated the principle of non-interference by tampering in U.S. elections;4 and 
nationalism, embodying a trend against international law, is on the rise in many Western 
nations.5  U.S. President Donald Trump has proposed cutting a significant portion of U.S. 
contributions to UN programs, which potentially threatens global stability6.  Nevertheless, 
the role of liberal institutions, specifically those championing international law, will likely 
continue despite the current nationalist backlash.7 
One fault in the current international order is that its reigning powers, namely the 
United States, appear to bend its rules for their benefit while requiring weaker states to 
fully comply with the rules.8  Challenges to international law are not new.  They have 
existed even as the modern international order began to establish itself.9  But powerful 
states are finding it more difficult to force weaker states to comply with their interests.  As 
William W. Burke-White found, “[t]he era in which the United States and Europe together 
                                                          
1 DR. WALTER L. WILLIAMS, JR., THE ATTITUDES OF THE LESSER DEVELOPED COUNTRIES TOWARD THE 
INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE 1 (1976) (quoting Chief S. O. Adebo). 
2 See, e.g., The Year of Living Dangerously, ECONOMIST, Dec. 24, 2016–Jan. 6, 2017, at 11 (noting that some 
liberals believe events in 2016 indicate a decline of liberal order). 
3 Karen Allen, Is This the End for the International Criminal Court?, BBC NEWS (Oct. 24, 2016), 
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-37750978. 
4 Scott Shane, Highlights from the House Hearing on Russian Interference in the U.S. Election, N.Y. TIMES 
(Mar. 20, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/20/us/politics/takeaways-russia-intelligence-committee-
hearing.html?_r=0. 
5 The Year of Living Dangerously, ECONOMIST, Dec. 24, 2016–Jan. 6, 2017, at 11. 
6 See US v. UN:  President Trump Seems Bent on Weakening the Global Body, ECONOMIST, Mar. 25–31, 
2017, at 52–53 (describing U.S. President Trump’s proposed budget cuts to UN programs). 
7 See, e.g., The Year of Living Dangerously, ECONOMIST, Dec. 24, 2016–Jan. 6, 2017, at 11 (“Such [liberal] 
ideas have imprinted themselves on the West—and, despite Mr Trump’s flirtation with protectionism, they 
will probably endure.”); Richard Haass, World 2.0:  The Case for Sovereign Obligation, FOREIGN AFF., 
Jan./Feb., 2017, at 2–9 (calling for increased international law and “sovereign obligations” to manage 
emerging global challenges). 
8 Michael J. Mazarr, The Once and Future Order:  What Comes After Hegemony?, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, 
Jan./Feb., 2017, at 26 (“When the leader of an order consistently appears to others to interpret the rules as it 
sees fit, the legitimacy of the system is undermined and other countries come to believe that the order offends, 
rather than sustains, their dignity.”). 
9 Oona A. Hathaway, Between Power and Principle:  An Integrated Theory of International Law, 72 U. CHI. 
L. REV. 469, 470 (2005). 
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could steer the international legal system has passed.”10  Burke-White asks whether 
international law can constrain power,11 but the deeper question is whether international 
law has a power of its own. 
While power has been thought to shape international law, international law itself 
has become a source of power for developing states.  This occurs as developing states use 
international law as a means to affect regional change.  Developing states’ reliance on 
international law, particularly as they form coherent foreign policy against counter-colonial 
backgrounds, strengthens international law as a process by which developing states express 
their interests.  Gradually, this strengthening snowballs to where it affects change in global 
international law processes and, at times, can act to constrain powerful states from acting 
in ways that directly reflect their personal interests.  Indeed, states’ reliance on international 
law to justify their actions demonstrates that international law itself has become a shared, 
global interest.  Therefore, international law possesses an unexpected form of power. 
This report seeks to explain international law as a source of power in its own right, 
using the ICJ and its decisions as case studies to show that international law itself may 
influence state behavior.  Part II discusses several theories that relate to whether 
international law may have power to influence state behavior.  Part III explains the 
methodology of the case study.  Part IV presents the three cases in detail.  Part V analyzes 
the cases to determine whether states complied with international law against their own 
interests.  Part VI concludes the report. 
 
II. Theory Discussion 
 
This Part will review several theories behind international law.  The first section 
will define power while the next two sections will review both realist and constructivist 
theories on international law.  Only recently have international relations and international 
law theorists worked to develop harmonized theories.  Historically, these two disciplines 
have not worked in tandem, specifically due to an initial rejection of the power of 
international law by the realist perspective of international relations theory.12  Thus several 
approaches combining international law and international relations theories will be 
examined.  The last section discusses developing states in the international system. 
 
a. Power 
 
Power is typically divided into two main subgroups:  Hard power and soft power.  
Hard power includes military power and economic power, while soft power encompasses 
almost every other form of coercive tools.  Soft power can include moral authority, cultural 
                                                          
10 William W. Burke-White, Power Shifts in International Law:  Structural Realignment and Substantive 
Pluralism, 56 HARVARD INT’L L.J. 1, 2 (2015). 
11 William W. Burke-White, Power Shifts in International Law:  Structural Realignment and Substantive 
Pluralism, 56 HARVARD INT’L L.J. 1, 4 (2015). 
12 Jeffrey L. Dunoff & Mark A. Pollack, International Law and International Relations:  Introducing an 
Interdisciplinary Dialogue, in INTERDISCIPLINARY PERSPECTIVES ON INTERNATIONAL LAW AND 
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS:  THE STATE OF THE ART 3 (Jeffrey L. Dunoff & Mark A. Pollack eds., 2013). 
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dominance, and political power. All power, whether hard or soft, is relative, meaning that 
the power of one entity can only be determined in relation to the power of another entity. 
The nature of power’s components changes under an international law interpretive 
lens.  “While military power remains relevant in international law, the general prohibition 
on the use of force under the U.N. Charter and the inherent constraints on the application 
of military force to many questions of international law limit its effectiveness.”13  Such a 
statement presumes that international law has the power to coerce state behavior, but it also 
indicates that international law places greater emphasis on non-military power.  Economic 
power, for instance, may correlate directly to legal influence via direct investment and trade 
relations.14  Moreover, “[u]nlike military power, the use of economic power—ranging from 
vote-buying to foreign assistance, from trade preferences to economic sanctions—is 
generally consistent with the norms of the international legal system and far less costly to 
the imposing state.”15 
In addition to hard and soft power, power should be subdivided into coercive power 
and inducive power.  Coercive power is an active power.  Powerful states create coercive 
power by pursuing their interests.  This pursuit causes weaker states to modify their 
interests so they do not conflict with the coercively powerful state’s interests.  The key 
actor in directing coercive power is the powerful state:  By directly pursuing its interests, 
the powerful state forces weaker states to act.  Inducive power, on the other hand, is a 
passive power.  Inducive power emanates from powerful states and attracts weaker states.  
Through the exertion of inducive power, weaker states modify their institutions and 
behaviors after those of powerful states.  Inducive power also encourages weaker states to 
support the interests of more powerful states.  Inducive power closely accords with soft 
power:  “The ‘pull’ of soft power, such as the desire to cooperate with like-minded states, 
the affinity for particular culture, or the shared sense of benevolent goals, operates 
legitimately within the international legal system and applies across a wide range of 
issues.”16 
For the purposes of this report, the relative power of states will be determined by 
reference to hard power.  There are two main reasons for this.  The first is that the purpose 
of this report is to demonstrate that more powerful states will sometimes act against their 
interests due to international law’s exertion of its own inherent power.  Thus there is more 
explanatory value in analyzing cases where the state with the most hard power acts against 
its interests.  Second, while international law’s power is not suitable for quantitative 
calculation, the determination of military and economic power may be calculated by 
reference to GDP (economic power) and the percentage of that GDP spent on the military 
(military power). 
                                                          
13 William W. Burke-White, Power Shifts in International Law:  Structural Realignment and Substantive 
Pluralism, 56 HARVARD INT’L L.J. 1, 13 (2015). 
14 William W. Burke-White, Power Shifts in International Law:  Structural Realignment and Substantive 
Pluralism, 56 HARVARD INT’L L.J. 1, 13 (2015). 
15 William W. Burke-White, Power Shifts in International Law:  Structural Realignment and Substantive 
Pluralism, 56 HARVARD INT’L L.J. 1, 13 (2015). 
16 William W. Burke-White, Power Shifts in International Law:  Structural Realignment and Substantive 
Pluralism, 56 HARVARD INT’L L.J. 1, 14 (2015). 
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b. Realism and International Law 
 
Realism is a school of political theory that emerged following World War II and 
which seeks to define international relations based on reality rather than the idealism that 
characterized previous schools of thought.17  Realism essentially argues that states compete 
in a zero-sum game with other states for power and security.18  Hans J. Morgenthau, the 
preeminent realist theorist, argued that “[i]nternational politics, like all politics, is a 
struggle for power.  Whatever the ultimate aims of international politics, power is always 
the immediate aim.”19  The basic components of realist theory are that states are the only 
actors on the international plane; states are homogenous entities acting self-interestedly; 
states act rationally; and the world exists in a state of anarchy.  Kenneth N. Waltz, a neo-
realist theorist, argued that “[a]mong states, the state of nature is a state of war.20  This is 
meant not in the sense that war constantly occurs but in the sense that, with each state 
deciding for itself whether or not to use force, war may at any time break out.”21 
While realists have long seen military power to be the determining factor in 
international relations, this view has been challenged.22  Modern realists have 
acknowledged that power must be conceptualized along military, economic, and 
diplomatic capabilities.23  They have also acknowledged that collective action, girded by 
international law, is required to meet emerging global challenges.24 
Goldsmith and Posner assert a rational-choice theory of international relations that 
corresponds to the realist perspective.  They assert that “international law emerges from 
states acting rationally to maximize their interests, given their perceptions of the interests 
of other states and the distribution of state power.”25 
Rational action occurs because “preferences about outcomes embedded in the state 
interest are consistent, complete, and transitive,” even if state sometimes do act irrationally 
                                                          
17 OONA A. HATHAWAY & HAROLD HONGJU KOH, FOUNDATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLITICS 27 
(2006). 
18 OONA A. HATHAWAY & HAROLD HONGJU KOH, FOUNDATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLITICS 27 
(2006). 
19 HANS J. MORGENTHAU, POLITICS AMONG NATIONS:  THE STRUGGLE FOR POWER AND PEACE 13 (1948). 
20 Peter J. Katzenstein et al., International Organization and The Study of World Politics, in OONA A. 
HATHAWAY & HAROLD HONGJU KOH, FOUNDATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLITICS 3, 4–5 (2006). 
21 KENNETH N. WALTZ, THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICS 102 (1979). 
22 See, e.g., LEO TOLSTOY, WAR AND PEACE 1032 (Richard Pevear & Larissa Volkhonsky trans., 2007) (“The 
period in the campaign of 1812 from the battle of Borodino to the expulsion of the French . . . proved that 
the force that decides the destiny of nations lies not in conquerors, not even in armies and battles, but in 
something else.”). 
23 See, e.g., Joseph S. Nye, Jr., Will the Liberal Order Survive?:  The History of an Idea, FOREIGN AFF., 
Jan./Feb., 2017 at 14–16 (acknowledging that power can no longer be determined purely by military might). 
24 See, e.g., Joseph S. Nye, Jr., Will the Liberal Order Survive?:  The History of an Idea, FOREIGN AFF., 
Jan./Feb., 2017 at 16 (“Trying to control the domestic politics of nationalistic foreign populations is a recipe 
for failure, and force has little to offer in addressing issues such as climate change, financial stability, or 
Internet governance.  Maintaining networks, working with other countries and international institutions, and 
helping establish norms to deal with new transnational issues are crucial.”). 
25 JACK L. GOLDSMITH & ERIC A. POSNER, THE LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 3 (2005). 
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as a result of their leaders’ mistakes or institutional failures.26  Moreover, a state acts only 
through the actions of its leaders.27  Goldsmith and Posner reject the assertion “that states 
comply with international law for noninstrumental reasons.”28  In other words, they reject 
the notion that states comply with international law “because compliance is the morally 
right or legitimate thing to do.”29  International law serves as a mask behind which states 
can obscure actions motivated by pure self-interest.30  In fact, any nominal 
acknowledgement of international law actually reflects “cheap talk” that, at a minimum, is 
simply expected of states or, at a maximum, is designed to facilitate coordination actions.31  
Goldsmith and Posner reject the notion that states’ interests “can be influenced by 
international law and institutions.”32 
It is critical to note that Goldsmith and Posner do not expand on why exactly states 
are expected to couch their actions in international law terms beyond purporting that 
international law rhetoric is convenient33 or that it obfuscates a state’s pursuit of its own 
interests.34  Perhaps their idea is that other states look for any reason to challenge another 
state’s self-promoting actions, and thus the absence of an international law justification 
(which is supposedly convenient) is pretext for challenge.  They claim “[i]t is 
unenlightening to explain international law compliance in terms of a preference for 
complying with international law.  Such an assumption says nothing interesting about when 
and why states act consistently with international law and provides no basis for 
understanding variation in, and violation of, international law.”35 
Put simply, Goldsmith and Posner sought to incorporate an understanding of 
economics into international law—some form of international law and economics theory.  
With their incorporation comes the criticism leveled at economic approaches to real 
situations.  Their perspective is also admittedly realist—specifically a variation known as 
neorealism.36 
Goldsmith and Posner assert that four situations explain state behaviors associated 
with international law:  (1) Coincidence of interest; (2) coordination; (3) cooperation; and 
(4) coercion.37  A coincidence of interest occurs when two states, driven by self-interest, 
act in a way that preserves the status quo.38  Coordination results from an agreement by 
                                                          
26 JACK L. GOLDSMITH & ERIC A. POSNER, THE LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 7 (2005). 
27 JACK L. GOLDSMITH & ERIC A. POSNER, THE LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 4 (2005). 
28 JACK L. GOLDSMITH & ERIC A. POSNER, THE LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 14 (2005). 
29 JACK L. GOLDSMITH & ERIC A. POSNER, THE LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 15 (2005). 
30 JACK L. GOLDSMITH & ERIC A. POSNER, THE LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 180 (2005).  (“[Talk of 
compliance with international law] is largely a ceremonial usage designed to enable the speaker to assert 
policies and goals without overtly admitting that he or she is acting for a purpose to which others might 
object.”). 
31 JACK L. GOLDSMITH & ERIC A. POSNER, THE LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 172–84 (2005). 
32 JACK L. GOLDSMITH & ERIC A. POSNER, THE LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 9 (2005). 
33 JACK L. GOLDSMITH & ERIC A. POSNER, THE LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 182 (2005). 
34 JACK L. GOLDSMITH & ERIC A. POSNER, THE LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 168 (2005). 
35 JACK L. GOLDSMITH & ERIC A. POSNER, THE LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 10 (2005). 
36 JACK L. GOLDSMITH & ERIC A. POSNER, THE LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 171 (2005). 
37 JACK L. GOLDSMITH & ERIC A. POSNER, THE LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 11–13 (2005).  The reduction 
to these four situations allows Goldsmith and Posner to incorporate game theory into their analysis. 
38 JACK L. GOLDSMITH & ERIC A. POSNER, THE LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 11–12 (2005). 
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two states designed to avoid conflict and reduce costs.39  Cooperation is reciprocal restrain 
from actions that would “otherwise be in [two states’] immediate self-interest in order to 
reap larger medium- or long-term benefits.”40  Coercion occurs when a power state “forces 
weaker states to engage in acts that are contrary to their interests.”41  Professors Goldsmith 
and Posner assert that some combination of these four situations explain all state behaviors 
associated with international law.42 
My criticism of Goldsmith and Posner’s work is one that can be leveled at economic 
theory in general:  While assumptions of interest-seeking and rational choice are helpful to 
create a general understanding of how some states may act, the assertion of the universality 
of these assumptions is dangerous.  Put simply, not all states act to promote their own self-
interest and not all states act rationally. 
 
c. Constructivism and International Law 
 
Constructivist theories seek to explain why states obey international law and how 
international law’s compliance mechanisms can be improved.43  Harold Hongju Koh wrote 
on the transnational legal process theory that synthesizes the making, interpretation, 
enforcement, and internalization of transnational laws in order to explain why states obey 
international law.44  Transnational legal process has four features: 
 
First it is nontraditional:  [I]t breaks down two traditional dichotomies that 
have historically dominated the study of international law:  [B]etween 
domestic and international, public and private.  Second, it is non-statist:  
[T]he actors in this process are not just, or even primarily, nation-states, but 
include nonstate actors as well.  Third, transnational legal process is 
dynamic, not static.  Transnational law transforms, mutates, and percolates 
up and down, from the public to the private, from the domestic to the 
international level and back down again.  Fourth and finally, it is normative.  
From this process of interaction, new rules of law emerge, which are 
interpreted, internalized, and enforced, thus beginning that process all over 
                                                          
39 JACK L. GOLDSMITH & ERIC A. POSNER, THE LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 12 (2005). 
40 JACK L. GOLDSMITH & ERIC A. POSNER, THE LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 12 (2005). 
41 JACK L. GOLDSMITH & ERIC A. POSNER, THE LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 12 (2005). 
42 JACK L. GOLDSMITH & ERIC A. POSNER, THE LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 13 (2005). 
43 See, e.g., CONSTANZE SCHULTE, COMPLIANCE WITH DECISIONS OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE 
6 (Philippe Sands et al. eds., 2004) (“[O]ne might analyze the issue through the lens of compliance theory, 
considering why states obey international law in general, what motivates them to obey international courts, 
and how mechanisms inducing compliance could be enhanced.  Another approach would be to focus on the 
potential for enforcement in the post-adjudicative phase, suggesting ways to improve the efficiency of various 
enforcement mechanisms.”). 
44 Harold Hongju Koh, Transnational Legal Process, 75 NEB. L. REV. 181, 183–84 (1996).  I initially wrote 
the next few paragraphs in an earlier work.  Christopher R. Marshall, Swaziland, the AGOA, and Convention 
87:  A Case Study for the Trade Preference Program Enforcement Model, 52 TEX. INT’L L.J. 163, 169–71 
(2017).  I have reproduced it here, giving minor edits to the language, because my analysis and criticism of 
the transnational legal process theory as a practical tool remains the same. 
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again.  Thus the concept embraces not just the descriptive workings of a 
process, but the normativity of that process.  It focuses not simply upon how 
international interaction among transnational actors shapes law, but also on 
how law shapes and guides future interactions:  [I]n short, how law 
influences why nations obey.45 
 
Koh addresses both the realist and liberalist perspectives on international law in 
discussing the transnational legal process theory.  He rejects the traditional realist approach 
outright.46  But in engaging with the liberalist perspective, Koh criticizes it for ignoring the 
fluidity of identity in influencing international norms.47  “Like national interests, national 
identities are not givens, but rather, socially constructed products of learning, knowledge, 
cultural practices, and ideology.”48  The critical feature of the transnational legal process 
theory is the interaction between all the movable parts of the transnational legal process 
theory and the internalization of norms that emerge from those interactions.49  The 
interactions between states, between a state and its non-state actors, between a state and 
international law, for example, create new perceptions of identity that become internalized 
through repeated interaction. 
The transnational legal process theory is very broad.  The multiple actors and their 
interactions, not just with each other but also with international law and their perceived 
identities, are difficult to follow as time exponentially increases the interactions and thus 
the changes through interactions.  Practically speaking, it would be difficult for a person 
applying this theory in real time to effectively determine when an enforcement mechanism 
would work. 
Perception of identity, along with identity in general, is a subjective feature that is 
not easily identified by outside observers.  A person applying the transnational theory 
would not only have to consider an actor’s perception of its identity, but would also have 
to begin a game-theory analysis of the actor’s perception of what the applying person’s 
perception of the actor’s perception of its identity is in order to effectively predict the 
creation of an identity-based norm.  Together, the broad nature of the theory and the 
indeterminate nature of its factors can potentially lead to its over-application and yield self-
confirming results. 
As a post-hoc tool, the transnational legal process theory may yield a high number 
of false positives due to the number of actors, factors, and interactions at play.  It thus 
straddles the line between a useful tool that could indicate when a state is likely to comply 
with a law or enforcement mechanism and an overly-descriptive theory that does not aid 
the real world person applying the theory.  Koh’s own description of the predictive power 
of the transnational legal process theory seems to make it fall into the latter category:  “It 
                                                          
45 Harold Hongju Koh, Transnational Legal Process, 75 NEB. L. REV. 181, 184 (1996). 
46 Harold Hongju Koh, Transnational Legal Process, 75 NEB. L. REV. 181, 199 (1996) (“As contemporary 
international relations theorists have long recognized, nations are not exclusively preoccupied with 
maximizing their power vis-a-vis one another in zero-sum games.”). 
47 Harold Hongju Koh, Transnational Legal Process, 75 NEB. L. REV. 181, 202 (1996). 
48 Harold Hongju Koh, Transnational Legal Process, 75 NEB. L. REV. 181, 202 (1996). 
49 Harold Hongju Koh, Transnational Legal Process, 75 NEB. L. REV. 181, 203–04 (1996). 
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predicts that nations will come into compliance with international norms if transnational 
legal processes are aggressively triggered by other transnational actors in a way that forces 
interaction in forums capable of generating norms, followed by norm-internalization.”50 
Oona A. Hathaway proposes an integrated theory of international law that combines 
international legal scholarship with international relations theory.51  Her theory asserts that 
state behavior, in the treaty context, is explained by the interactive nature of a state’s 
decisions about whether or not to commit to international rules or whether or not to comply 
with them.52  In her words, “compliance not only depends upon the decision to commit, 
but commitment also depends upon the decision to comply.”53  Her model purports to 
explain why states refuse to join treaties with which compliance would be easy and why 
states join treaties with which they do not intend to comply.54  In the former case, the state 
has much to lose and little to gain, while in the latter case, the state has much to gain and 
little to lose.55 
Hathaway highlights two broad theoretical approaches to the role of international 
law on state behavior:  Interest-based theory and norms-based theory.56  Interest-based 
theory focuses on states as “rational, unitary actors in pursuit of self-interest.”57  There are 
two key assumptions:  (1) States engage in consequentialist means-end calculations; and 
(2) a state’s interests can be inferred from its material characteristics and its objective 
conditions.58  Interest-based theories thus correspond to the realist perspective of 
international law.  Hathaway argues that while interest-based theorists argue that states use 
international law rhetoric as “cheap talk,” these theorists “give no explanation as to why 
such cover is valuable—as to why, that is, the great powers feel the need to justify the 
                                                          
50 Harold Hongju Koh, Transnational Legal Process, 75 NEB. L. REV. 181, 206 (1996). 
51 Oona A. Hathaway, Between Power and Principle:  An Integrated Theory of International Law, 72 U. CHI. 
L. REV. 469, 472 (2005). 
52 Oona A. Hathaway, Between Power and Principle:  An Integrated Theory of International Law, 72 U. CHI. 
L. REV. 469, 473 (2005). 
53 Oona A. Hathaway, Between Power and Principle:  An Integrated Theory of International Law, 72 U. CHI. 
L. REV. 469, 473 (2005). 
54 Oona A. Hathaway, Between Power and Principle:  An Integrated Theory of International Law, 72 U. CHI. 
L. REV. 469, 473–74 (2005). 
55 Oona A. Hathaway, Between Power and Principle:  An Integrated Theory of International Law, 72 U. CHI. 
L. REV. 469, 473–74 (2005). 
56 Oona A. Hathaway, Between Power and Principle:  An Integrated Theory of International Law, 72 U. CHI. 
L. REV. 469, 476–77 (2005). 
57 Oona A. Hathaway, Between Power and Principle:  An Integrated Theory of International Law, 72 U. CHI. 
L. REV. 469, 478 (2005). 
58 Oona A. Hathaway, Between Power and Principle:  An Integrated Theory of International Law, 72 U. CHI. 
L. REV. 469, 479 (2005). 
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pursuit of their interests.”59  She argues that interest-based theories fail to explain why 
states join treaties with which they do not expect to comply.60 
Norms-based theorists argue that state behavior is motivated by the power of 
principled ideas in addition to the state’s self-interest.61  States internalize these principled 
ideas and act in a manner that accords with them because states believe the ideas to be 
correct or appropriate.62  International law thus changes state action not by constraining 
behavior, but by altering the preferences of states.63  Hathaway argues that the flaw of 
norms-based theories is that they do not explain why states join treaties, but focus instead 
on the issue of compliance.64  The norms-based analysis of compliance also has little 
predictive value for state behavior—it mostly acts as a post-hoc tool.65 
A key difference between the two theories is that “[i]nterest-based scholars tend to 
conclude that international law that is not backed by sanctions is not effective.  Norm-based 
scholars, by contrast, conclude that international law need not be backed by sanctions to 
influence state behavior.”66 
Hathaway’s integrated theory rejects the claim that state behavior will not be 
modified where international law is not enforced, but does not discount the value of 
enforcement.67  A state’s decision to commit or comply with international law depends 
upon legal enforcement, determined by the terms of the treaty and their enforcement as 
specific legal obligations, and collateral consequences, which arise from the anticipated 
reactions of individuals, states, and organizations in relation to the decision to commit to a 
treaty and then to abide or not abide by its terms.68  These two incentives operate at both 
the domestic and transnational level.69  In determining whether or not to incur an 
                                                          
59 Oona A. Hathaway, Between Power and Principle:  An Integrated Theory of International Law, 72 U. CHI. 
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60 Oona A. Hathaway, Between Power and Principle:  An Integrated Theory of International Law, 72 U. CHI. 
L. REV. 469, 480–81 (2005). 
61 Oona A. Hathaway, Between Power and Principle:  An Integrated Theory of International Law, 72 U. CHI. 
L. REV. 469, 481 (2005). 
62 Oona A. Hathaway, Between Power and Principle:  An Integrated Theory of International Law, 72 U. CHI. 
L. REV. 469, 481 (2005). 
63 Oona A. Hathaway, Between Power and Principle:  An Integrated Theory of International Law, 72 U. CHI. 
L. REV. 469, 481 (2005). 
64 Oona A. Hathaway, Between Power and Principle:  An Integrated Theory of International Law, 72 U. CHI. 
L. REV. 469, 481–82 (2005). 
65 Oona A. Hathaway, Between Power and Principle:  An Integrated Theory of International Law, 72 U. CHI. 
L. REV. 469, 483 (2005). 
66 Oona A. Hathaway, Between Power and Principle:  An Integrated Theory of International Law, 72 U. CHI. 
L. REV. 469, 491 (2005). 
67 Oona A. Hathaway, Between Power and Principle:  An Integrated Theory of International Law, 72 U. CHI. 
L. REV. 469, 492 (2005). 
68 Oona A. Hathaway, Between Power and Principle:  An Integrated Theory of International Law, 72 U. CHI. 
L. REV. 469, 492 (2005). 
69 Oona A. Hathaway, Between Power and Principle:  An Integrated Theory of International Law, 72 U. CHI. 
L. REV. 469, 492 (2005). 
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international obligation, a state will weigh the costs and benefits of compliance, which 
inherently depend upon the degree of expected compliance with the commitment.70  The 
process is thus iterative. 
Hathaway’s key assertion is that states possessing domestic institutions with the 
capacity to enforce international obligations against the state are less likely to formally 
incur international legal obligations, but are more likely to change their behavior to comply 
with international legal requirements.71  Moreover, states that lack such domestic 
institutions are more likely to incur international legal requirements, but are less likely to 
alter their behavior.72  Hathaway thus takes a bottom-up view of international law:  Law 
that is enforced domestically will be successful at the international level. 
Burke-White identified three basic features of the new international law power 
structure:  (1) Diffusion, meaning that many states are amassing power; (2) disaggregation, 
meaning that more types of power have emerged; and (3) asymmetric distribution, with the 
result that power is more relevant on an issue-specific basis.73  Burke-White dubbed this 
new system “multi-hub,” as distinct from unipolar, bipolar, and multipolar systems.74  The 
multi-hub system permits any state to lead “international legal processes or articulating 
preferences that attract followers and alter substantive norms.”75  Consequently, the ability 
to coerce through traditional power, a necessary feature of a multipolar system, is less 
important than the ability to attract followers.76  “The multi-hub system thereby empowers 
states that are not hubs in a particular instance with choices as to which of a number of 
hubs to follow on any given issue or even to build the issue-specific power necessary to 
assume leadership themselves.”77  The main effect is that power in the international system 
is decentralized, making it relevant only in “separate, flexible subsystems.”78  Burke-White 
suggests that the changing structure of international law is due to observable shifts in 
military, economic, and soft power.79  He incorporates the economic principle of 
                                                          
70 Oona A. Hathaway, Between Power and Principle:  An Integrated Theory of International Law, 72 U. CHI. 
L. REV. 469, 492–93 (2005). 
71 Oona A. Hathaway, Between Power and Principle:  An Integrated Theory of International Law, 72 U. CHI. 
L. REV. 469, 512 (2005). 
72 Oona A. Hathaway, Between Power and Principle:  An Integrated Theory of International Law, 72 U. CHI. 
L. REV. 469, 512 (2005). 
73 William W. Burke-White, Power Shifts in International Law:  Structural Realignment and Substantive 
Pluralism, 56 HARVARD INT’L L.J. 1, 5–6 (2015). 
74 William W. Burke-White, Power Shifts in International Law:  Structural Realignment and Substantive 
Pluralism, 56 HARVARD INT’L L.J. 1, 6 (2015) (describing a multipolar system as a fixed group of powers or 
poles dominating weaker states by engaging each other in rivalry and balancing). 
75 William W. Burke-White, Power Shifts in International Law:  Structural Realignment and Substantive 
Pluralism, 56 HARVARD INT’L L.J. 1, 6 (2015). 
76 William W. Burke-White, Power Shifts in International Law:  Structural Realignment and Substantive 
Pluralism, 56 HARVARD INT’L L.J. 1, 6 (2015). 
77 William W. Burke-White, Power Shifts in International Law:  Structural Realignment and Substantive 
Pluralism, 56 HARVARD INT’L L.J. 1, 6 (2015). 
78 William W. Burke-White, Power Shifts in International Law:  Structural Realignment and Substantive 
Pluralism, 56 HARVARD INT’L L.J. 1, 6 (2015). 
79 William W. Burke-White, Power Shifts in International Law:  Structural Realignment and Substantive 
Pluralism, 56 HARVARD INT’L L.J. 1, 14 (2015). 
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comparative advantage to suggest that a comparative advantage in the issue-specific form 
of power will carry the day even if the state with the comparative power advantage does 
not have an absolute power advantage.80 
 
d. Developing States and International Law 
 
Developing states have been involved, as they emerge, with the development of 
international law.81  Their increased involvement corresponds with their expanding 
abilities to shape international law to their own interests.  Indeed, “rising powers are not 
attempting to wholly destroy the edifice of international law nor even rejecting 
international law per se.  Rather, they are seeking to adjust the system from within and to 
make contemporary international law more compatible with their own preferences.”82  
Such findings contradict arguments that developing states, which are mostly non-Western, 
resist the imposition of international law because it is driven by Western liberal ideology.83 
Dr. Walter L. Williams, Jr. reviewed the compliance of “lesser developed 
countries” with ICJ decisions.  By 1976, none of them had failed to comply with a final 
judgment.84  Dr. Williams noted, however, that Albania had not complied with the third 
judgment of the Corfu Channel Case; Iran had not complied with the interim protection 
measures of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. Case; and France had not complied with the interim 
protection measures in the Nuclear Test Cases.85  Moreover, while many developing states 
had not declared the ICJ’s jurisdiction compulsory, a significant number were party to 
bilateral or multilateral agreements that named the ICJ as the forum for dispute resolution.86  
This pattern “indicates that many [lesser developed countries] who have not accepted the 
compulsory jurisdiction of the Court are nevertheless willing to confer jurisdiction on the 
Court to handle disputes arising out of specific agreements.”87  Many lesser developed 
                                                          
80 William W. Burke-White, Power Shifts in International Law:  Structural Realignment and Substantive 
Pluralism, 56 HARVARD INT’L L.J. 1, 14 (2015). 
81 See DR. WALTER L. WILLIAMS, JR., THE ATTITUDES OF THE LESSER DEVELOPED COUNTRIES TOWARD THE 
INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE 2 (1976) (“What is indeed noteworthy about the conduct of the [lesser-
developed states] is not that they have opted out of the international legal process, but rather, that they are 
intensively engaged in all features of that process to create, maintain, modify or terminate prescriptions of 
international law in ways best suited to achieve the world community goals that they favor.”). 
82 William W. Burke-White, Power Shifts in International Law:  Structural Realignment and Substantive 
Pluralism, 56 HARVARD INT’L L.J. 1, 3 (2015) (italics in the original). 
83 DR. WALTER L. WILLIAMS, JR., THE ATTITUDES OF THE LESSER DEVELOPED COUNTRIES TOWARD THE 
INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE 5, 13 (1976). 
84 DR. WALTER L. WILLIAMS, JR., THE ATTITUDES OF THE LESSER DEVELOPED COUNTRIES TOWARD THE 
INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE 30 (1976). 
85 DR. WALTER L. WILLIAMS, JR., THE ATTITUDES OF THE LESSER DEVELOPED COUNTRIES TOWARD THE 
INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE 30–31 (1976). 
86 DR. WALTER L. WILLIAMS, JR., THE ATTITUDES OF THE LESSER DEVELOPED COUNTRIES TOWARD THE 
INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE 34, 38, 40–42 (1976). 
87 DR. WALTER L. WILLIAMS, JR., THE ATTITUDES OF THE LESSER DEVELOPED COUNTRIES TOWARD THE 
INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE 44 (1976). 
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countries were also parties to agreements allowing the President of the ICJ to appoint 
impartial officials to mediate or settle disputes under the agreements.88 
Dr. Williams concluded that any hesitancy of lesser developed countries to accept 
the jurisdiction of the ICJ was not motivated by a rejection of the ICJ as a product of 
Western ideals, but only where international law was particularly damaging to a state’s 
position in a dispute.89  In fact, since 1945 many lesser developed countries sought to make 
the ICJ’s jurisdiction a mandatory component of the UN Charter.90  Lesser developed 
countries’ challenges to international law are not a rejection of international law itself, but 
an attempt to shape international law to lesser developed countries’ interests.91  
Additionally, much of lesser developed countries’ ambivalence toward fully accepting the 
compulsory jurisdiction of the ICJ was a result of “benign neglect.”92  In other words, lesser 
developed countries had not found it necessary to accept the ICJ’s compulsory 
jurisdiction.93  Likely, this attitude existed because it was not yet clear how, in the 1970s, 
the ICJ could act as a forum for weak states to bind powerful states’ from asserting their 
interests to the detriment of the weak state.94 
Meanwhile, developed states—or to put it in the terms of this report, powerful 
states—have been hesitant to fully recognize the ICJ as the forum to resolve international 
disputes.95  Dr. Williams found that lesser developed countries, like developed states, 
“would prefer to use the Court when an advantage could be gained and would prefer to 
avoid its use when something could be lost.”96  Hathaway’s integrated theory of 
                                                          
88 DR. WALTER L. WILLIAMS, JR., THE ATTITUDES OF THE LESSER DEVELOPED COUNTRIES TOWARD THE 
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61 (1976). 
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INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE 57 (1976). 
93 DR. WALTER L. WILLIAMS, JR., THE ATTITUDES OF THE LESSER DEVELOPED COUNTRIES TOWARD THE 
INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE 55–58 (1976). 
94 DR. WALTER L. WILLIAMS, JR., THE ATTITUDES OF THE LESSER DEVELOPED COUNTRIES TOWARD THE 
INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE 58 (1976) (“Implicit in this view is the opinion that the Court is not 
playing a meaningful role in the international affairs of States, or, to put the proposition differently, that 
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95 DR. WALTER L. WILLIAMS, JR., THE ATTITUDES OF THE LESSER DEVELOPED COUNTRIES TOWARD THE 
INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE 52 (1976). 
96 DR. WALTER L. WILLIAMS, JR., THE ATTITUDES OF THE LESSER DEVELOPED COUNTRIES TOWARD THE 
INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE 62 (1976). 
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international law would argue that powerful states resist international intrusions partly 
because their domestic courts will resolve disputes in a compatible manner with any 
international resolution.97  Rational-choice theorists would argue that it is not within 
powerful states’ interests to allow an impartial international body resolve disputes affecting 
the powerful state’s interests.98  And Dr. Williams qualified his finding by stating that his 
finding reflected the circumstances that, even though the ICJ had greatly evolved since 
1946, it was still evolving along with the international community.99  “The exciting 
prospect for the Court is not what will be its role in 1980, or 1990, but in the Twenty-First 
Century, and it is today’s leaders, and in a very real sense, concerned citizens of all States, 
who in large measure will brighten or dim the prospects for future, more constructive 
attitudes toward the International Court of Justice.”100 
 
III. Methodology 
 
a. The International Court of Justice 
 
To analyze the effects of international law on powerful states, the ICJ and its 
decisions prove excellent test subjects.  States from virtually every background—Western, 
non-Western, capitalist, communist, developing, developed, etc.—have had “a reason to 
refuse to implement [an ICJ] ruling, or violently attack it.”101  Nevertheless, the ICJ has 
survived as a relevant forum for states of all strengths to air their grievances against one 
another.  This durability has been won in spite of the volatile relationship that many states 
have with international law:  Several commentators have remarked that “[t]he most striking 
feature of the pattern of use of the International Court of Justice since 1946 is its 
irregularity.”102 
Additionally, the ICJ has virtually no enforcement power, so a more powerful 
state’s compliance with its judgments against that state’s interests will show that 
international law itself may have influenced that state’s behavior.  “[S]ince the ICJ is the 
judicial authority of an international society made of equals, and since it lacks its own 
enforcement powers, the only way it has to ensure actual compliance with its decisions is 
persuading the parties of the worth of its decisions.”103  This statement, while certainly 
valid, does not encapsulate the totality of the ICJ’s power, nor that of international law in 
                                                          
97 Oona A. Hathaway, Between Power and Principle:  An Integrated Theory of International Law, 72 U. CHI. 
L. REV. 469, 512 (2005). 
98 JACK L. GOLDSMITH & ERIC A. POSNER, THE LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 9 (2005). 
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DECISIONS OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE viii (Philippe Sands et al. eds., 2004). 
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its own right.  While states have chafed at the ICJ’s decisions, by and large there is a trend 
of compliance with international law asserted in an ICJ decision.104  While specific 
compliance with ICJ judgments is surely a measure of the success of international law in 
subverting the interests of powerful states,105 it is certainly not the only metric. 
But the concerns over the “worthiness” of ICJ decisions reveal the multiplicity of 
factors involved in analyzing influences on state behavior.  Even assuming total 
compliance, “the perceived inadequacy of the ICJ as a settlement mechanism . . . might 
discourage states from submitting further cases.”106  The ICJ thus has a vested interest in 
ensuring states comply with its judgments.  While this may indicate that the ICJ will choose 
the path of least resistance, the judgments in the selected cases did not, by any measure, 
follow those paths.  The selected cases were specifically chosen because they reflect a 
judgment against the interests of the more powerful state. 
Explicit or visible non-compliance with an ICJ judgment registers as a prima facie 
failure for compliance.107  But, ultimately, the failure may be rebutted by a state’s actions 
that do ultimately comply with the judgment, albeit in a subtler manner.  The distinction 
will depend upon the circumstances of the individual cases, though the ultimate goal is to 
distinguish cases where non-compliance is “pure talk”108 from those cases where non-
compliance reflects international law’s subordination to state interests. 
The ICJ has jurisdiction over any matter which state parties refer to it, as well as in 
all matters specifically provided for in the UN Charter and where provided in treaties.109  
States may declare that the ICJ has compulsory jurisdiction over all legal disputes between 
state parties involving the interpretation of treaties; questions of international law; the 
existence of any fact that would constitute a breach of an international obligation; and the 
nature or extent of reparations to be made for the breach of an international obligation.110  
Such state declarations may be unconditional, on the condition of reciprocity, or limited to 
a certain period of time.111  The ICJ settles all disputes as to whether the ICJ has 
jurisdiction.112 
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b. Case Selection 
 
There are many cases that may demonstrate that international law, in and of itself, 
has the power to influence a state’s behavior.  The LaGrand Case, for instance, may serve 
as an example of the perceived efficacy of ICJ decisions to influence state behavior.  The 
major accomplishment of the LaGrand Case was the ICJ’s decision that its provisional 
measures would be binding under article 41 of the ICJ Statute.113  Given the concerns 
surrounding the ICJ as an effective forum for dispute resolution, one would assume that 
the ICJ would not expand its binding authority unless it was sure that states would respect 
that authority.  Indeed, the LaGrand Case may go even further than its landmark holding—
by finding the authority to issue binding preliminary decisions implicit in the ICJ’s function 
as a judicial institution, the ICJ concretely asserted itself as more than a political instrument 
for powerful states to assert their interests.114  Coupled with broad praise from states,115 the 
LaGrand Case may further secure compliance with ICJ decisions. 
Additionally, the United States’s actions regarding the jurisdiction of the ICJ reveal 
a respect for the power of international law.  Prior to rejecting the ICJ’s compulsory 
jurisdiction,116 the United States declared several conditions to its jurisdictional 
acceptance.  Among other reservations, the United States refused to grant the ICJ 
jurisdiction to entertain “disputes with regard to matters that are essentially within the 
domestic jurisdiction of the United States of America as determined by the United States 
of America.”117  This reservation was known as the Connally Amendment.118  In the 
Interhandel Case, the United States argued that the ICJ lacked jurisdiction to resolve the 
matter because the matter was domestic.119  The ICJ withheld ruling on the United States’s 
jurisdictional claim, but stilled ruled in favor of the United States on March 21, 1959.120 
On September 3, 1959, Bulgaria argued that the Connally Amendment barred the 
ICJ from resolving the issues presented in the Case Concerning the Aerial Incident of 27 
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July 1955, because the issue was a domestic, Bulgarian issue.121  Bulgaria argued, in other 
words, that the Connally Amendment was a double-edged sword:  If the United States 
could use it to bar review of cases where the United States was the respondent, the United 
States must respect another state’s invocation of the Connally Amendment where the 
United States was the applicant. 
While the United States initially challenged Bulgaria’s assertion, it later 
discontinued the proceedings against Bulgaria.122  Judge Hersch Lauterpacht’s vociferous 
disapproval of the Connally Amendment was likely a motivating factor.123  In effect, the 
United States conceded to Bulgaria the power to remove an issue from the ICJ’s 
jurisdiction by declaring it to be a domestic matter.124 
The Connally Amendment debacle reflects one instance of international law 
prevailing over the interests of a powerful state.  Admittedly, the key international law 
principle was not the validity of the Connally Amendment, which judges in both the 
Interhandel Case and the Case Concerning the Aerial Incident of 27 July 1955 contested, 
but the functionality of the Connally Amendment as a matter of the ICJ Statute’s 
reciprocity requirements.125  Rational-choice theorists may argue that the United States’s 
long-term interests were best served by conceding that the Connally Amendment was 
reciprocal.  Such an argument is flawed.  Rational-choice theorists base their theory on 
states pursuing their self-interest.  If a state’s goal were to maximize its self-interest, then 
it would always act in accordance with its interests regardless of future negative 
consequences.126  Based on rational-choice theory’s own assumptions, the United States 
should never have conceded the reciprocity of the Connally Amendment.  The rational-
choice theory fails to explain the United States’s actions. 
The following cases were selected because they each involved an obviously powerful 
state pitted against a less powerful state.  Moreover, two of the cases (The Territorial 
Dispute and Armed Activities) involved exclusively non-Western powers.  This factor is 
significant because Western powers may have a vested interest in preserving the 
international law system, which largely reflects Western norms and values.  Non-Western 
states, however, have no such incentive.  Those two cases thus remove a possible 
intervening variable that may be present in other ICJ cases.  While Nicaragua involved a 
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Objections, 1959 I.C.J. 95, 119 (Mar. 21) (“The United States cannot avail itself of its—legally ineffective—
Declaration of Acceptance in order to bring an action before the Court against another State; but for the very 
reason that the Declaration is legally ineffective no State can invoke it against the United States.”). 
124 DR. WALTER L. WILLIAMS, JR., THE ATTITUDES OF THE LESSER DEVELOPED COUNTRIES TOWARD THE 
INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE 18 (1976). 
125 DR. WALTER L. WILLIAMS, JR., THE ATTITUDES OF THE LESSER DEVELOPED COUNTRIES TOWARD THE 
INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE 20 (1976). 
126 See generally SHAUN P. HARGREAVES HEAP & YANIS VAROUFAKIS, GAME THEORY:  A CRITICAL TEXT 
80–126 (2004). 
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Western power, the United States, it was a case of initial noncompliance by that Western 
power.  Thus if respect for international law as a Western institution were an intervening 
variable, it did not obviously influence the United States’s behavior immediately following 
the ICJ’s judgment.  Finally, the following three cases were selected because of they are 
landmark ICJ cases. 
 
IV. Case Studies 
 
a. Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and 
Against Nicaragua 
 
i. Procedure 
 
On April 9, 1984, Nicaragua filed an application with the Registry of the ICJ to 
institute proceedings against the United States over a “dispute concerning the responsibility 
for military and paramilitary activities in and against Nicaragua.”127  Nicaragua alleged 
that the United States: 
 
(1) had recruited, trained, armed, equipped, financed, supplied, and 
otherwise encouraged, supported, aided, and directed military and 
paramilitary activities in and against Nicaragua in violation of article 
2(4) of the UN Charter, articles 18 and 20 of the Charter of the 
Organization of American States, article 8 of the Convention on Rights 
and Duties of States, and article I, Third, of the Convention Concerning 
the Duties and Rights of States in the Event of Civil Strife; 
(2) had violated Nicaragua’s sovereignty in breach of general and 
customary international law; 
(3) had used force and the threat of force against Nicaragua in breach of 
general and customary international law; 
(4) had intervened in Nicaragua’s internal affairs in breach of general and 
customary international law; 
(5) had infringed on the freedom of the high seas and interrupted peaceful 
maritime commerce in breach of general and customary international 
law; and 
(6) had killed wounded, and kidnapped Nicaraguan citizens in breach of 
general and customary international law.128 
 
Accordingly, Nicaragua asserted that the United States must cease and desist from: 
 
                                                          
127 Application of the Republic of Nicaragua, Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua 
(Nicar. v. U.S.), (Apr. 9, 1984), http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/70/9615.pdf. 
128 Application of the Republic of Nicaragua, Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua 
(Nicar. v. U.S.), art. 26(a)–(f) (Apr. 9, 1984), http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/70/9615.pdf. 
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(1) all direct or indirect, overt or covert use of force against Nicaragua and 
all threats of force against Nicaragua; 
(2) all violations of Nicaragua’s sovereignty, territorial integrity, and 
political independence, including all direct or indirect intervention in 
Nicaragua’s internal affairs; 
(3) all support of any kind to any group or individual engaged or planning 
to engage in military or paramilitary actions in or against Nicaragua; 
(4) all efforts to restrict, block, or endanger access to or from Nicaraguan 
ports; and 
(5) all killings, woundings, and kidnappings of Nicaraguan citizens.129 
 
At the same time, Nicaragua filed a request for provisional measures.130  
Specifically, Nicaragua requested the ICJ require that the United States cease and desist 
from directly or indirectly providing any support to any group or individual engaging in 
military or paramilitary activities in and against Nicaragua and that the United States cease 
and desist any military or paramilitary activities conducted by its own officials.131 
On May 10, 1984, the ICJ imposed the following provisional measures:  (1) The 
United States should cease and desist from any action “restricting, blocking or endangering 
access to or from Nicaraguan ports, and, in particular, the laying of mines;” (2) both states 
should respect the principle of non-interference; (3) both states should take no further 
action that “might aggravate or extend the dispute;” and (4) both states should take no 
action that might prejudice the rights of the other “in respect of the carrying out of whatever 
decision the Court may render in the case.”132  In the same order, the ICJ decided to first 
address whether it had jurisdiction to entertain the dispute and the admissibility of 
Nicaragua’s application.133 
Nicaragua argued that the ICJ had jurisdiction under article 36 of the Statute of the 
ICJ, as well as under article XXIV(2) of the 1956 Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and 
Navigation between the United States and Nicaragua.134 
                                                          
129 Application of the Republic of Nicaragua, Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua 
(Nicar. v. U.S.), art. 26(g)–(h) (Apr. 9, 1984), http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/70/9615.pdf. 
130 Request for the Indication of Provisional Measures of Protection Submitted by the Government of 
Nicaragua, Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), (Apr. 9, 1984), 
http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/70/9629.pdf. 
131 Request for the Indication of Provisional Measures of Protection Submitted by the Government of 
Nicaragua, Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), para. 10 (Apr. 9, 
1984), http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/70/9629.pdf. 
132 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), Request for the Indication 
of Provisional Measures, 1984 I.C.J. 169, para. 40(B)(1)–(4) (May 10). 
133 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), Request for the Indication 
of Provisional Measures, 1984 I.C.J. 169, para. 40(D) (May 10). 
134 Memorial of Nicaragua (Questions of Jurisdiction and Admissibility), Military and Paramilitary Activities 
in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1984 I.C.J. Pleadings 361, para. 267(A) & (D) (June 30, 1984).  
See also Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation Between the United States of America and the 
Republic of Nicaragua.  Signed at Managua, on 21 January 1956, Nicar.-U.S., Jan. 21, 1956, 367 U.N.T.S. 
3, art. XXIV(2) (“Any dispute between the Parties as to the interpretation or application of the present Treaty, 
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The United States, in a 447-page Counter-Memorial, argued that Nicaragua’s 
claims were not within the ICJ’s jurisdiction and that Nicaragua’s application was 
inadmissible.135  Notably, the United States argued that (1) the UN Charter accorded 
jurisdiction to the Security Council or other UN organs;136 and (2) the ICJ could not 
consider whether the use of force violated the UN Charter in an “ongoing armed conflict” 
without overstepping its bounds.137 
On November 26, 1984, the ICJ found in favor of Nicaragua’s two arguments and 
ruled that it had jurisdiction to entertain the case.138  It also found that Nicaragua’s 
application was admissible.139 
On January 18, 1985, Davis R. Robinson, the U.S. Agent in the proceeding, 
transmitted a letter to the ICJ in which he announced that the United States would no longer 
participate in the proceedings: 
 
[T]he United States is constrained to conclude that the judgment of the 
Court was clearly and manifestly erroneous as to both fact and law.  The 
United States remains firmly of the view . . . that the Court is without 
jurisdiction to entertain the dispute, and that the Nicaraguan application . . . 
is inadmissible.  Accordingly, it is my duty to inform you that the United 
States intends not to participate in any further proceedings in connection 
with this case, and reserves its rights in respect of any decision by the Court 
regarding Nicaragua’s claims.140 
 
On January 22, 1985, the ICJ set the time limits for the filing of Nicaragua’s 
Memorial and the United States’s Counter-Memorial on the merits of the dispute.141  
Nicaragua filed its Memorial within the time limit, but the United States did not make any 
                                                          
not satisfactorily adjusted by diplomacy, shall be submitted to the International Court of Justice, unless the 
Parties agree to settlement by some other pacific means.”). 
135 Counter-Memorial of the United States of America (Questions of Jurisdiction and Admissibility), I.C.J. 
Pleadings, Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), Vol. II, para. 552 
(Aug. 17, 1984). 
136 Counter-Memorial of the United States of America (Questions of Jurisdiction and Admissibility), I.C.J. 
Pleadings, Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), Vol. II, paras. 450–
59 (Aug. 17, 1984). 
137 Counter-Memorial of the United States of America (Questions of Jurisdiction and Admissibility), I.C.J. 
Pleadings, Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), Vol. II, paras. 520–
31 (Aug. 17, 1984). 
138 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), Jurisdiction and 
Admissibility, 1984 I.C.J. 392, para. 113(1)(a)–(c) (Nov. 26). 
139 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), Jurisdiction and 
Admissibility, 1984 I.C.J. 392, para. 113(2) (Nov. 26). 
140 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), Correspondence, No. 114, 
http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/70/9635.pdf. 
141 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), Order of 22 January 1985, 
1985 I.C.J. 3, 4 (Jan. 22). 
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filing.142  Prior to filing its Memorial, Nicaragua called on the ICJ to resolve the dispute in 
its favor despite the failure of the United States to appear or defend itself, pursuant to article 
53 of the Statute of the ICJ.143 
In its Memorial, Nicaragua requested the ICJ: 
 
(1) declare and ajudge that the United States had violated and continued to 
violate international law; 
(2) state how the United States must cease its breaches of international law; 
(3) award compensation to Nicaragua, on its behalf and the behalf of its 
citizens, and determine such compensation in a subsequent proceeding. 
(4) Award 370,200,000 USD to Nicaragua as “the minimum valuation of 
the direct damages,” excepting damages for the killing of Nicaraguan 
nationals.144 
 
The ICJ held the public hearings on the merits on September 12–13 and 16–20, 
1985.145  The United States was not represented at the hearing.146  On May 1, 1985, the 
United States had terminated the 1956 Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation 
                                                          
142 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), Judgment, 1986 I.C.J. 14, 
para. 11 (June 27). 
143 The exact time of Nicaragua’s request under art. 53 is ambiguous.  While the ICJ’s Judgment states that 
Nicaragua invoked art. 53 in its Memorial, the Nicaraguan Memorial makes reference to Nicaragua invoking 
art. 53 prior to the filing.  Compare Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. 
U.S.), Judgment, 1986 I.C.J. 14, para. 11 (June 27) with Memorial of Nicaragua, Military and Paramilitary 
Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), Vol. IV, para. 4 (Apr. 30, 1985).  See also Statute of the 
International Court of Justice art. 53(1) (“Whenever one of the parties does not appear before the Court, or 
fails to defend its case, the other party may call upon the Court to decide in favor of its claim.”). 
144 Memorial of Nicaragua, Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 
Vol. IV, para. 507 (Apr. 30, 1985). 
 
As a matter of law, Nicaragua claims, inter alia, that the United States has acted in violation 
of Article 2, paragraph 4, of the United Nations Charter, and of a customary international 
law obligation to refrain from the threat or use of force; that its actions amount to 
intervention in the internal affairs of Nicaragua, in breach of the Charter of the 
Organization of American States and of rules of customary international law forbidding 
intervention; and that the United States has acted in violation of the sovereignty of 
Nicaragua, in in violation of a number of other obligations established in general customary 
international law and in the inter-American system.  The actions of the United States are 
also claimed by Nicaragua to be such as to defeat the object and purpose of a Treaty of 
Friendship, Commerce and Navigation concluded between the Parties in 1956, and to be 
in breach of provisions of that Treaty. 
 
Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), Judgment, 1986 I.C.J. 14, 
para. 23 (June 27). 
145 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), Judgment, 1986 I.C.J. 14, 
para. 13 (June 27). 
146 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), Judgment, 1986 I.C.J. 14, 
para. 36 (June 27). 
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with Nicaragua, and on October 7, 1985, the United States deposited a notice terminating 
the ICJ’s jurisdiction under article 36 of the ICJ Statute.147 
 
ii. Facts 
 
The ICJ noted the difficulty it encountered in trying to establish a factual record.148  
The disagreement between the United States and Nicaragua on the interpretation or 
existence of some facts; the United States’s refusal to participate in the proceedings on the 
merits; and the secrecy under which the alleged actions were carried out made it “difficult 
for the Court not only to decide on the imputability of facts, but also to establish what the 
facts are.”149  Additionally, the fact that the conflict was ongoing further complicated 
establishing a trustworthy factual record.150  The ICJ thus declared the somewhat rigorous 
standards by which it would evaluate the evidence that had been presented,151 before 
analyzing whether specific factual allegations had been specifically established.  The 
following subsections break down the factual allegations into thematic categories. 
 
(1) The Historical Context 
 
The dispute between Nicaragua and the United States arose from the events 
following the fall of Nicaraguan President Anastasio Somoza Debayle’s government in 
July 1979 and the rise of the Sandinistas.152  Somoza resigned on July 17, 1979, ceding to 
mounting pressure from the United States, and named Francisco Urcuyo Maleanos his 
successor.153  Somoza fled to Miami four hours after resigning.154  Urcuyo fled to 
                                                          
147 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), Judgment, 1986 I.C.J. 14, 
para. 13 (June 27). 
148 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), Judgment, 1986 I.C.J. 14, 
para. 57 (June 27) (“One of the Court’s chief difficulties in the present case has been the determination of the 
facts relevant to the dispute.”). 
149 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), Judgment, 1986 I.C.J. 14, 
para. 57 (June 27). 
150 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), Judgment, 1986 I.C.J. 14, 
para. 58 (June 27). 
151 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), Judgment, 1986 I.C.J. 14, 
paras. 58–74 (June 27). 
152 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), Judgment, 1986 I.C.J. 14, 
para. 18 (June 27). 
153 Karen DeYoung, Somoza Resigns, Successor Named, WASH. POST, July 17, 1979, 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1979/07/17/somoza-resigns-successor-named/484f5386-
f93a-4df8-8409-93f56187f0dc/?utm_term=.226d4f3d3b03; John M. Goshko, U.S. Is Pressing Somoza to 
Quit, Leave Nicaragua, WASH. POST, June 28, 1979, https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/
1979/06/28/us-is-pressing-somoza-to-quit-leave-nicaragua/a5c08c57-2b7f-4725-9581-e6529f834956/?utm
_term=.20846babfd37. 
154 Ángel Luis de la Calle, Somoza Abandonó Nicaragua en Compañía de Sus Colaboradores Directos, PAÍS, 
July 18, 1979, http://elpais.com/diario/1979/07/18/internacional/301096808_850215.html.  Somoza was 
denied entry into the United States and had to flee to Paraguay, instead.  He was assassinated on September 
18, 1980.  Cynthia Gorney, Somoza Is Assassinated in Ambush in Paraguay, WASH. POST, Sept. 18, 1980, 
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Guatemala the next day, allowing the guerrilla Sandinista National Liberation Front (the 
“Sandinistas”) to seize control of Managua, Nicaragua’s capital.155  The Junta of National 
Reconstruction, the Sandinista’s governing wing, then became the controlling government 
of Nicaragua.156 
The United States initially had friendly relations with the new Nicaraguan 
government, even adopting an economic aid program.157  In January 1981, however, the 
United States suspended aid to Nicaragua based on evidence that Nicaragua may have 
supplied arms to left-wing guerrillas in El Salvador.158  By April 1981, the United States 
terminated all economic aid for Nicaragua, but left open the possibility of continuing the 
aid program if Nicaragua ceased aiding Salvadoran guerrillas.159  While diplomatic 
relations continued, Nicaragua alleged that the United States began to plan and conduct 
activities against Nicaragua in September 1981.160 
In 1981, the Fuerza Democrática Nicaragüense (the “FDN”) began conducting 
operations against the Sandinista government from the Honduran border.161  By 1982, the 
Alianza Revolucionaria Democrática (the “ARDE”) had formed and was operating against 
the Sandinista government from the Costa Rican border.162  These two guerrilla forces 
comprised part of the “contras,” forces fighting against the Sandinista government.163 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1980/09/18/somoza-is-assassinated-in-ambush-in-
paraguay/61c8684c-207a-4328-b957-14e5e944a8a3/?utm_term=.de8f3dc4f80e. 
155 Ángel Luis de la Calle, La Junta de Reconstrucción Nacional Gobierna en Nicaragua Desde Ayer, PAÍS, 
July 20, 1979, http://elpais.com/diario/1979/07/20/internacional/301269610_850215.html. 
156 Ángel Luis de la Calle, La Junta de Reconstrucción Nacional Gobierna en Nicaragua Desde Ayer, PAÍS, 
July 20, 1979, http://elpais.com/diario/1979/07/20/internacional/301269610_850215.html. 
157 International Security and Development Cooperation Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-533, § 533, 94 Stat. 
3131,  (“The Congress finds that peaceful and democratic development in Central America is in the interest 
of the United States and of the community of American States generally, that the recent civil strife in 
Nicaragua has caused great human suffering and disruption to the economy of that country, and that 
substantial external assistance to Nicaragua is necessary to help alleviate that suffering and to promote 
economic recovery within a peaceful and democratic process.”). 
158 Juan de Onis, U.S. Halts Nicaragua Aid over Help for Guerillas, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 23, 1981, 
http://www.nytimes.com/1981/01/23/world/us-halts-nicaragua-aid-over-help-for-guerillas.html. 
159 U.S. Halts Economic Aid to Nicaragua, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 2, 1981, http://www.nytimes.com/1981/04/02/
world/us-halts-economic-aid-to-nicaragua.html. 
160 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), Judgment, 1986 I.C.J. 14, 
para. 19 (June 27). 
161 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), Judgment, 1986 I.C.J. 14, 
para. 20 (June 27). 
162 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), Judgment, 1986 I.C.J. 14, 
para. 20 (June 27). 
163 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), Judgment, 1986 I.C.J. 14, 
para. 20 (June 27). 
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(2) U.S. Aquatic Mines 
 
Beginning February 25, 1984, several watercraft were damaged by mines in the 
Nicaraguan ports of El Bluff, Corinto, and Puerto Sandino.164  The mines effectively closed 
Nicaraguan ports for two months.165  Nicaragua claimed that a total of 12 vessels or fishing 
boats were damaged, 14 people were wounded, and two people were killed.166  The ICJ 
received no direct evidence of the size or nature of the mines—some were allegedly 
incapable of sinking a ship while others could have contained up to 300 pounds of 
explosives.167  Press releases quoted U.S. administration officials saying that the CIA 
constructed mines in a U.S. Navy Laboratory.168 
In a March 2, 1984 report in Lloyds List and Shipping Gazette, the ARDE claimed 
responsibility for the mining.169  An affidavit by Edgar Chamorro, a former political leader 
of the FDN, alleged that CIA officials instructed him to claim via clandestine radio that the 
FDN had mined several Nicaraguan harbors on January 5, 1984.170  A press report claimed 
the contras had announced they were mining all Nicaraguan ports on January 8, 1984.171  
The ICJ was unable to find evidence that the United States had warned other states of the 
existence of mines in Nicaraguan ports.172 
On April 10, 1984, it was announced in the U.S. Senate that the Director of the CIA 
had informed the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence that U.S. President Ronald 
Reagan had approved a CIA plan to mine Nicaraguan ports in either December 1983 or 
February 1984.173  In response to the announcement, the U.S. Senate passed the Deficit 
Reduction Act of 1984 which, in part, declared that “no funds heretofore or hereafter 
appropriated in any Act of Congress shall be obligated or expended for the purpose of 
planning, directing, executing or supporting the mining of the ports or territorial waters of 
Nicaragua.”174  Reagan, during a May 28, 1984 televised interview with Brian Farrell, 
                                                          
164 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), Judgment, 1986 I.C.J. 14, 
para. 76 (June 27). 
165 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), Judgment, 1986 I.C.J. 14, 
para. 76 (June 27). 
166 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), Judgment, 1986 I.C.J. 14, 
para. 76 (June 27). 
167 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), Judgment, 1986 I.C.J. 14, 
para. 76 (June 27). 
168 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), Judgment, 1986 I.C.J. 14, 
para. 76 (June 27). 
169 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), Judgment, 1986 I.C.J. 14, 
para. 77 (June 27). 
170 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), Judgment, 1986 I.C.J. 14, 
para. 77 (June 27). 
171 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), Judgment, 1986 I.C.J. 14, 
para. 77 (June 27). 
172 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), Judgment, 1986 I.C.J. 14, 
para. 77 (June 27). 
173 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), Judgment, 1986 I.C.J. 14, 
para. 78 (June 27). 
174 Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, § 2907, 98 Stat. 494, 1210 (1984). 
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claimed that the mines were homemade and had been planted by Nicaraguan rebels.175  
Press reports quoting U.S. administration sources claimed that the mining was carried out 
by persons of the nationality of unidentified Latin American countries (referred to as 
“UCLAs”)176 who entered Nicaraguan territorial waters via speed boats provided by the 
U.S. government.177  The speed boats were allegedly launched from vessels operated by 
U.S. nationals that remained outside of Nicaragua’s territorial waters.178 
Nicaragua also submitted evidence that the mining of its ports led to increased 
marine insurance rates for cargo to and from Nicaragua, in addition to some shipping 
companies stopping their voyages to Nicaraguan ports.179 
The ICJ found that it had been sufficiently established that Reagan had authorized 
a U.S. government agency to mine Nicaraguan ports.180  Moreover, the evidence presented 
established that such mining did occur in early 1984 in the ports of El Bluff, Corinto, and 
Puerto Sandino.181  Persons paid by and acting under the instructions of that U.S. 
government agency carried out the mining operations under the supervision and with 
logistical support from U.S. agents.182  Further, the ICJ found that the United States did not 
issue any warning about the location of the mines and that the mining caused personal and 
material injury, which caused a rise in marine insurance rates to vessels traveling to 
Nicaraguan ports.183 
 
(3) Direct U.S. or UCLA Actions 
 
Nicaragua presented evidence of ten actions apart from the mining of its ports that 
it directly attributed to U.S. personnel or UCLAs: 
 
(1) September 8, 1983:  An attack on the Sandino international airport in 
Managua by a Cessna aircraft, which was shot down; 
(2) September 12, 1983:  The explosion of an underwater oil pipeline and part 
of the oil terminal at Puerto Sandino; 
                                                          
175 Interview by Brian Farrell, RTE-Television, with Ronald Reagan, U.S. President, in Dublin, Ir. (May 28, 
1984), https://www.reaganlibrary.archives.gov/archives/speeches/1984/52884b.htm. 
176 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), Judgment, 1986 I.C.J. 14, 
para. 75 (June 27). 
177 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), Judgment, 1986 I.C.J. 14, 
para. 78 (June 27). 
178 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), Judgment, 1986 I.C.J. 14, 
para. 78 (June 27). 
179 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), Judgment, 1986 I.C.J. 14, 
para. 79 (June 27). 
180 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), Judgment, 1986 I.C.J. 14, 
para. 80 (June 27). 
181 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), Judgment, 1986 I.C.J. 14, 
para. 80 (June 27). 
182 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), Judgment, 1986 I.C.J. 14, 
para. 80 (June 27). 
183 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), Judgment, 1986 I.C.J. 14, 
para. 80 (June 27). 
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(3) October 2, 1983:  An attack on the oil storage facilities at Benjamin 
Zeledon, resulting in the loss of a large quantity of fuel; 
(4) October 10, 1983:  A sea and air attack on the Corinto port, causing the 
destruction of five oil storage tanks, the loss of millions of gallons of fuel, 
and the evacuation of a large number of the local population; 
(5) October 14, 1983:  A second explosion of the underwater oil pipeline at 
Puerto Sandino; 
(6) January 4–5, 1984:  An attack on the Potosí Naval Base by speedboats and 
helicopters using rockets; 
(7) February 24–25, 1984:  An unspecified incident at the El Bluff port, which 
probably involved U.S. mining at Nicaraguan ports; 
(8) March 7, 1984:  An attack on the oil and storage facility at San Juan del Sur 
by speedboats and helicopters; 
(9) March 28–30, 1984:  Clashes at Puerto Sandino during the minelaying 
operations by speedboats and a supporting helicopter against Nicaraguan 
patrol boats; 
(10) April 9, 1984:  A helicopter providing supporting fire to an ARDE attack 
on San Juan del Norte.184 
 
At the time, the contras were the principle suspects behind the operations.185  Nicaragua 
presented evidence that, in response to a question regarding the October 10, 1983 attack on 
the Corinto port, Reagan stated: 
 
I think covert actions have been a part of government and a part of 
government’s responsibilities for as long as there has been a government.  I’m 
not going to comment on what, if any, connection such activities might have 
had with what has been going on, or with some of the specific operations 
down there. 
But I do believe in the right of a country when it believes that its interests are 
best served to practice covert activity and then, while your people may have 
a right to know, you can’t let your people know without letting the wrong 
people know, those that are in opposition to what you’re doing.186 
 
Nicaragua asserted that this statement constituted an admission “that the United States was 
habitually and systematically giving aid to mercenaries carrying out military operations 
against the Government of Nicaragua.”187  The ICJ refused to consider this statement 
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constituted an admission, but noted that it indicated the United States was involved in the 
Corinto attack.188 
Relying on the affidavit and testimony of Commander Luis Carrión, Nicaragua’s 
Vice-Minister of the Interior; an article in The Wall Street Journal;189 and the affidavit of 
Chamorro, the ICJ determined that it could not consider the first and third allegations as 
being properly established and that the seventh allegation was already established by its 
consideration of the mining of Nicaragua’s ports.190  For the remaining allegations, the ICJ 
determined that they had been sufficiently established: 
 
A ‘mother ship’ was supplied (apparently leased) by the CIA; whether it 
was of United States registry does not appear.  Speedboats, guns and 
ammunition were supplied by the United States administration, and the 
actual attacks were carried out by ‘UCLAs’.  Helicopters piloted by 
Nicaraguans and others piloted by United States nationals were also 
involved on some occasions.  According to one report the pilots were United 
States civilians under contract by the CIA.  Although it is not proved that 
any United States military personnel took a direct part in the operations, 
agents of the United States participated in the planning, direction, support 
and execution of the operations.  The execution was the task rather of the 
‘UCLAs’, while United States nationals participated in the planning, 
direction and support.  The imputability to the United States of these attacks 
appears therefore to the Court to be established.191 
 
 
(4) U.S. Violations of Nicaraguan Airspace 
 
Nicaragua alleged that U.S. aircraft had violated Nicaraguan airspace in conducting 
high-altitude “overflights” for reconnaissance purposes, low-altitude supply drops for the 
contras, and sonic booms created by U.S. aircraft.192  The ICJ considered that a 
“Background Paper” filed by the United States, which contained eight aerial photographs 
of Nicaraguan territory, indicated that the United States carried out sporadic overflights.193  
Additionally, the United States had made statements before the Security Council on March, 
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2 1985 that indicated the United States was carrying out overflights at that time.194  The 
ICJ considered that Nicaragua had failed to establish that the United States had conducted 
low-altitude supply drops in violation of Nicaraguan airspace because Nicaragua had not 
presented any specific evidence beyond indicating that the United States had made planes 
available to the contras for the purpose of supply operations.195  As to the sonic booms 
created in November 1984, the ICJ found these events to be a matter of public knowledge, 
relying on Nicaragua’s assertions before the Security Council and the United States’s 
refusal to comment on the assertions.196 
 
(5) U.S.-Honduran Military Maneuvers 
 
Nicaragua claimed that the United States had conducted a number of joint military 
maneuvers with Honduras along the Honduran-Nicaraguan border.197  Military equipment 
was allegedly flown into the country for the exercises and then turned over to the contras.198  
The maneuvers occurred in fall 1982, February 1983, August 1983, November 1984, 
February 1985, March 1985, and June 1985.199  The ICJ considered this information to be 
public knowledge as there was no secrecy surrounding the maneuvers—thus it accepted 
that the maneuvers occurred as sufficiently established.200 
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(6) U.S. Aid to the Contras 
 
a. U.S. Creation of the Contras 
 
Nicaragua alleged that the United States had “conceived, created and organized a 
mercenary army, the contra force” shortly after March 9, 1981.201  But the ICJ observed 
that Nicaragua’s own evidence established that the contras had existed and conducted 
armed opposition against the government during 1979–80.202  Commander Carrión 
testified that the armed groups prior to December 1981 consisted of “the ex-National 
Guardsmen who had fled to Honduras when the Somoza government fell and had been 
conducting sporadic raids on Nicaraguan border positions ever since.”203  The ICJ found 
this testimony constituted an admission that the United States did not create the contras.204  
The ICJ similarly rejected Nicaragua’s assertion that the United States, acting through CIA 
operatives, unified opposition bands into the FDN.205 
 
b. U.S. Financing 
 
News reports indicated that the size of contra forces increased substantially after 
receiving U.S. financing.  The forces allegedly grew from 500 men in December 1981 to 
12,000 in November 1983.206  When U.S. aid was cut off in September 1984, the contra 
forces were over 10,000 men.207 
Financing apparently began in 1981 when the CIA provided 19.5 million USD to 
the contras out of funds allocated for covert actions.208  An additional 19 million USD was 
provided in late 1981 under the authorization of the National Security Decision Directive 
17.209  Further financing operations were unclear, but it appeared that approximately 20 
million USD had been provided for fiscal year 1982–83 through the Intelligence 
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Authorization Act and the Defense Appropriations Act.210  The Permanent Select 
Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives attempted to amend the 
Defense Appropriations Act to prohibit U.S. support for military and paramilitary 
operations in Nicaragua in May 1983, but the Senate rejected the amendment.211  When 
Reagan requested 45 million USD for operations in Nicaragua, the House and Senate 
reached a compromise on December 8, 1983, approving only 24 million USD for military 
and paramilitary operations in Nicaragua.212  In March 1984, Reagan requested an 
additional 21 million USD, but the House of Representatives did not approve the request.213  
In June 1984, Reagan requested an additional 28 million USD, which resulted in the 
passage of the Continuing Appropriations Act of 1985.214  The Act prohibited the use of 
funds for fiscal year 1984–85 to support the contras, but would provide 14 million USD if 
the President submitted a report to Congress justifying such an appropriation, to be 
approved by Congress.215   
On April 10, 1985, Reagan submitted a report stating “United States policy toward 
Nicaragua since the Sandinistas’ ascent to power has consistently sought to achieve 
changes in Nicaraguan government policy and behavior.  We have not sought to overthrow 
the Nicaraguan Government nor to force on Nicaragua a specific system of government.”216  
The changes sought were (1) the termination of Nicaraguan support to Central American 
insurgents; (2) a reduction of Nicaragua’s military and security apparatus; (3) the severance 
of Nicaragua’s military and security ties to the Soviet Bloc and Cuba; and (4) the 
implementation of Sandinista commitment to the Organization of American States to 
political pluralism, human rights, free elections, non-alignment, and a mixed economy.217  
The House of Representatives rejected the appropriation.218 
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In June 1985, Reagan requested Congress appropriate 38 million USD to fund 
military and paramilitary operations against Nicaragua during fiscal year 1985–86.219  
While the Senate approved the appropriation, the House of Representatives only approved 
an appropriation of 27 million USD for humanitarian assistance to the contras, which was 
to be provided by any U.S. agency except the CIA or Department of Defense.220 
The ICJ found that “from 1981 until 30 September 1984 the United States 
Government was providing funds for military and paramilitary activities by the contras in 
Nicaragua, and thereafter for ‘humanitarian assistance.’”221 
 
c. U.S. Control and Direction 
 
Nicaragua asserted that the contras were so dependent upon U.S. financing as to 
give the United States effective control over the contras’ actions.222  Additionally, 
Nicaragua alleged that the United States developed the strategies of the FDN.223  Nicaragua 
primarily relied on Chamorro’s affidavit, which alleged that former National Guardsmen 
had been offered regular salaries by the CIA in 1981.224  Chamorro claimed that the CIA 
began providing FAL and AK-47 assault rifles, mortars, ammunition, equipment, and 
food.225  The CIA also allegedly provided funds for “communications, assistance to 
Nicaraguan refugees or family members of FDN combatants, and a military and logistics 
budget.”226  Chamorro asserted the CIA also provided training in “guerilla warfare, 
sabotage, demolitions, and in the use of a variety of weapons, including assault rifles, 
machine guns, mortars, grenade launchers, and explosives, such as Claymore mines.”227  
Moreover, the CIA allegedly supplied intelligence and aircraft for reconnaissance and 
supply drops to the FDN.228 
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Chamorro’s affidavit also claimed that CIA advisers were highly involved in the 
planning and discussion of FDN strategy and tactics.229  Specifically, Chamorro asserted 
that (1) CIA operatives “urg[ed]” the FDN to launch an offensive to take and hold 
Nicaraguan territory at the end of 1982; (2) CIA operatives issued a directive in 1983 to 
not destroy farms and crops, but reversed that directive in 1984; and (3) CIA operatives 
again encouraged the seizure of Nicaraguan territory, supplying intelligence and aircraft 
for the operation.230 
The ICJ refused to find, based solely on the FDN’s dependence on U.S. financing, 
that the United States planned the FDN’s offensives.231  Moreover, in light of the evidence, 
the ICJ was “not satisfied that all operations launched by the contra force, at every stage 
of the conflict, reflected strategy and tactics wholly devised by the United States.”232  
Nevertheless, the ICJ found it “clear that a number of military and paramilitary operations 
by this force were decided and planned, if not actually by United States advisers, then at 
least in close collaboration with them, and on the basis of intelligence and logistic support 
which the United States was able to offer, particularly the supply aircraft provided to the 
contras by the United States.”233  These findings led the ICJ to conclude that the United 
States “largely financed, trained, equipped, armed and organized the FDN.”234  
Additionally, the ICJ considered it established that the FDN had, at one point, been so 
dependent on U.S. financing that it could not conduct its operations without U.S. 
support.235  These findings also led the ICJ to reject Nicaragua’s assertion that the United 
States had effective control over the contras, such that the contras’ violations of 
international law implicated U.S. legal responsibility.236 
 
(7) CIA Psychological Warfare 
 
Nicaragua presented two manuals to the ICJ that it claimed were prepared by the 
CIA and supplied to the contras in 1983:  “Operaciones sicológicas en guerra de 
guerrillas,” (“Psychological Operations in Guerrilla Warfare”) and the “Freedom Fighter’s 
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Manual.”237  The ICJ refused to conclude that the Freedom Fighter’s Manual had been 
published by the CIA solely on the basis of newspaper articles claiming that the CIA 
authored the manual.238 
The ICJ did consider that the CIA had authored the Psychological Operations 
manual on the basis of the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of 
Representatives report that specifically stated the CIA had created it.239  The ICJ noted that 
several parts of the manual, which was devoted to winning community support against 
Nicaraguan forces, contained sections which violated general international humanitarian 
law.240  In particular, the section titled “Implicit and Explicit Terror” included directions to 
destroy military and police installations, cut lines of communication, kidnap Sandinista 
officials, and “to fire on a citizen who was trying to leave town” in order to prevent the 
citizen from informing government forces.241  The section titled “Selective Use of Violence 
for Propagandistic Effects” stated  
 
It is possible to neutralize carefully selected and planned targets, such as 
court judges, mesta judges, police and State Security officials, CDS chiefs, 
etc.  For psychological purposes it is necessary to take extreme precautions, 
and it is absolutely necessary to gather together the population affected, so 
that they will be present, take part in the act, and formulate accusations 
against the oppressor.242 
 
Another section, titled “Control of mass concentrations and meetings,” advocated hiring 
professional criminals “to carry out selective ‘jobs,’” and contemplated having civilians 
shot by the authorities so that they would become martyrs.243 
Chamorro took multiple conflicting positions on the effectiveness of the manual.  
At one point, he claimed to have distributed 2,000 copies to FDN members.244  At another 
point, he claimed that no one read the report.245  In his affidavit, Chamorro stated that some 
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unit commanders regarded “the best way to win the loyalty of the civilian population was 
to intimidate it . . . and make it fearful of us.”246 
The Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives 
attempted to discover the author of the manual.  After extensive review, the Committee 
concluded: 
 
[T]he manual was written, edited, distributed and used without adequate 
supervision.  No one but its author paid much attention to the manual. . . .  
The entire publication and distribution of the manual was marked within the 
[CIA] by confusion about who had authority and responsibility for the 
manual. . . .  Negligence, not intent to violate the law, marked the manual’s 
history.247 
 
The ICJ concluded that it had been sufficiently established that a U.S. agency had 
provided the Psychological Operations manual to the FDN in 1983.248  The manual, while 
discouraging indiscriminate violence against civilians advocated for violations of general 
international humanitarian law.249 
 
(8) U.S. Economic Measures 
 
Nicaragua alleged that the United States indirectly intervened in its internal affairs 
via economic measures including the suspension of economic aid in April 1981.250  Prior 
to the suspension, the United States had provided more than 100 million USD in aid 
between July 1979 and January 1981.251  Reagan suspended the aid pursuant to the Special 
Central American Assistance Act, which required the President to certify that Nicaragua 
was not “aiding, abetting or supporting acts of violence and terrorism in other countries.”252  
Reagan refused to certify Nicaragua as compliant with the Act on April 1, 1981, 
terminating the aid.253  Nicaragua claimed that the impact of this termination was in excess 
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of 36 million USD per year.254  Nicaragua also alleged that the United States had acted to 
block loans to Nicaragua from the Bank for International Reconstruction and Development 
and the Inter-American Development Bank.255  Additionally, Nicaragua alleged that 
Reagan had reduced U.S. quotas for imports of Nicaraguan sugar by 90%, which caused a 
damage of between 15 USD and 18 million USD.256  Further, Reagan declared a public 
emergency via Executive Order on May 1, 1985 in order to impose a total trade embargo 
on Nicaragua.257 
 
(9) Nicaraguan Arms Trafficking to Salvadoran Rebels 
 
The ICJ interpreted the U.S. Counter-Memorial on jurisdiction and admissibility to 
assert that the United States had acted on the basis of collective self-defense in order to 
protect El Salvador, Honduras, and Costa Rica from Nicaragua’s support of anti-
government forces fighting against those states.258  Nicaragua argued that the assertion of 
collective self-defense was merely pretext for U.S. operations against Nicaragua.259  The 
ICJ concluded that even if the United States had used Nicaragua’s support of armed 
opposition groups in El Salvador as pretext for operations against Nicaragua, that 
conclusion did not vitiate the right of collective self-defense.260 
The United States had attached the affidavit of Secretary of State George P. Shultz 
to its Counter-Memorial, which claimed that “[t]he United States has abundant evidence 
that the Government of Nicaragua has actively supported armed groups engaged in military 
and paramilitary activities in and against El Salvador.”261  In supporting these armed 
groups, the affidavit alleged that Nicaragua had assisted with communications facilities, 
command and control headquarters, logistics, planning of operations, and training.262  
Additionally Nicaragua had acted as a transshipment point for ammunition, supplies, and 
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weapons bound for these armed groups.263  The affidavit also alleged that Nicaragua was 
engaged in similar actions involving armed opposition groups in both Costa Rica and 
Honduras.264  The affidavit contained references to protests by the Presidents of Costa Rica, 
El Salvador, and Honduras as to Nicaragua’s actions.265 
David MacMichael, a former CIA official, testifying on behalf of Nicaragua could 
“not rule it out” that Nicaragua had been engaged in the operations alleged by the United 
States.266  In fact, MacMichael leaned toward “ruling [the operations] ‘in’ than ruling 
‘out.’”267  A Nicaraguan report of a meeting held between Commander Ortega, the 
Coordinator of the Junta of the Government of Nicaragua, and Mr. Enders, the Assistant 
Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs of the United States, also seemed to indicate 
that Nicaragua was engaged in the alleged operations.268  Moreover the Permanent Select 
Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives had concluded that such 
operations were occurring.269 
El Salvador had attempted to intervene in the ICJ proceedings, but the ICJ rejected 
its Declaration of Intervention.270  Nevertheless, the ICJ noted that El Salvador had asserted 
that the Nicaraguan Foreign Minister had admitted to supplying armed opposition groups 
during a July 1983 meeting with other Foreign Ministers.271  The ICJ refused to conclude 
that such an admission had occurred solely on the basis of El Salvador’s Declaration of 
Intervention without further corroborative evidence.272  Moreover, the ICJ refused to rely 
solely on press reports claiming that Nicaragua had aided Salvadoran rebels as sufficient 
to establish that fact.273  These press reports included a New York Times interview with 
Nicaraguan President Daniel Ortega Saavedra, during which Ortega stated “We’re willing 
to stop the movement of military aid, or any kind of aid through Nicaragua to El 
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Salvador.”274  The ICJ stated that given “the background of firm denial by the Nicaraguan 
Government of complicity in an arms flow to El Salvador, the Court cannot regard remarks 
of this kind as an admission that the Government was in fact doing what it had already 
officially denied and continued subsequently to deny publicly.”275 
Nicaragua firmly denied that it had been supplying arms to Salvadoran armed 
groups.276  Nicaragua also asserted that the geographic features of its northern and southern 
borders—rugged mountains and dense jungles—made patrol efforts difficult, and it was 
likely that rebel groups had taken advantage of the terrain to ship arms and supplies in spite 
of Nicaragua’s efforts to halt such shipments.277 
The ICJ was not blind to the similar doctrines of the Sandinistas and the Salvadoran 
rebels.278  Based on the totality of the evidence, including evidence that Nicaragua 
controlled a small airstrip used to supply Salvadoran armed groups, the ICJ concluded that 
Nicaragua had provided at least some aid to Salvadoran armed groups between 1979 and 
1981.279  But it found that it did not have sufficient evidence before it to determine that 
Nicaragua had actively participated in supplying the Salvadoran rebels after 1981.280  
Based on the little evidence provided, the ICJ concluded that it was possible Nicaragua was 
unaware of the cross-border arms trafficking into El Salvador.281  In any case, the ICJ 
determined that insufficient evidence had been presented to establish that Nicaragua was 
legally responsible for any arms trafficking into El Salvador.282 
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(10) Nicaraguan Cross-Border Military Attacks in 
Honduras and Costa Rica 
 
Nicaragua exclusively challenged the allegations that it had supplied arms or 
provided other assistance to groups in El Salvador,283 while the United States had provided 
some evidence that Nicaragua had been involved in cross-border attacks into Honduras and 
Costa Rica.284  The evidence included a diplomatic notes of protest for incidents in 
September 1983, February 1984, and April 1984.285  The ICJ noted that Nicaragua’s silence 
on the matter and concluded that Nicaragua had been involved in cross-border military 
attacks on both Costa Rica and Honduras.286 
 
(11) Failure of the Sandinista Government to Comply 
with Its Promises to the Organization of American States 
 
On July 12, 1979, representatives of the Sandinista government sent a telegram to 
the Secretary-General of the Organization of American States, which included the “Plan of 
the Government of National Reconstruction to Secure Peace.”287  The plan sought to ratify 
some goals in connection with a Resolution of the Seventeenth Meeting of Consultation of 
Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the Organization of American States, which had called for 
the replacement of the Somoza government, the installation of a democratic government, 
the guarantee of respect for human rights in Nicaragua, and the holding of free elections.288  
The Sandinista statement declared, among other things, a firm intention to observe human 
rights and a plan to hold free elections.289 
The ICJ noted that, at the time of the proceedings, the Sandinista government had 
failed to ratify several important human rights treaties and had a declared a state of 
emergency on numerous occasions.290  Free elections had been held on November 4, 1984, 
but there were allegations that the conditions were unsatisfactory.291 
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iii. Judgment 
 
The ICJ noted that “[a] special feature of the present case is that the United States 
only ceased to take part in the proceedings after a Judgment had been given adverse to its 
contentions on jurisdiction and admissibility.”292  The ICJ interpreted the U.S. Counter-
Memorial on Jurisdiction and Admissibility to assert that the United States had acted 
pursuant to its right of collective self-defense under the article 51 of the UN Charter.293 
The ICJ first dismissed the United States’s assertion that it lacked jurisdiction to 
decide the dispute,294 then addressed whether Nicaragua’s claim was well founded in fact 
and law, per article 53 of the ICJ Statute.295  In this consideration, the ICJ determined that 
the United States’s absence could neither prejudice its decision in Nicaragua’s favor, nor 
could it prejudice its decision in the United States’s favor.296  Consequently, the ICJ would 
apply a standard that “is not susceptible of rigid definition in the form of a precise general 
rule” in evaluating previous submissions by the United States.297  The ICJ unsurprisingly 
rejected the justiciability claims that the United States raised in its Counter-Memorial on 
the jurisdiction and admissibility of Nicaragua’s claim.298  It also held that it still had 
jurisdiction to hear the dispute despite the United States’s termination of both the 1956 
Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation with Nicaragua and the optional clause 
under the ICJ Statute.299 
The ICJ then went on to hold that it could not base any findings of violations on 
article 2(4) of the UN Charter nor articles 18, 20, and 21 of the Organization of American 
States Charter because the U.S. declaration under article 36 of the ICJ Statute excluded 
cases where other states that were not involved in the adjudication would be “affected” by 
a judgment on a dispute arising out of a multilateral treaty.300  Specifically, the ICJ found 
that a judgment under the UN Charter or OAS Charter would affect the rights of El 
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Salvador.301  The ICJ noted, however, that it could still rely on these treaties as sources of 
international law.302 
The ICJ proceeded to undertake an extensive review of the types of evidence it 
would consider and the persuasiveness of the evidence presented, given that the United 
States had not participated in the proceedings on the merits.303  The ICJ rejected 
Nicaragua’s contention that asserting the right of collective self-defense was tantamount to 
admitting that the United States had direct and substantial involvement in the military and 
paramilitary operations against Nicaragua.304 
After determining the factual record on which the ICJ could base its findings, 
discussed above, the ICJ proceeded to address the relevant law it could apply to the case.  
The United States had previously declared a reservation to ICJ jurisdiction, prohibiting it 
from extending to “disputes arising under multilateral treaties, unless (1) all parties to the 
treaty affected by the decision are also parties to the case before the Court, or (2) the United 
States of American specifically agrees to jurisdiction.”305  As a result, the ICJ found it was 
unable to find violations of multilateral treaties.306  In spite of this finding, the ICJ observed 
that it could use those multilateral treaties as evidence of customary international law and 
could apply customary international law to the case.307  The ICJ then determined the 
customary international law relevant to the case, referring to the principle of non-
intervention, the prohibition of the threat or use of force, state sovereignty, and 
international humanitarian law.308  Additionally, the ICJ interpreted the 1956 Treaty of 
Friendship, Commerce and Navigation between the United States and Nicaragua, which 
did not fall under the U.S. multilateral treaty reservation to ICJ jurisdiction, as requiring a 
determination of whether threats posed by Nicaragua constituted a reasonable threat to 
essential security interests and whether U.S. measures taken against those threats were 
necessary.309 
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The ICJ first analyzed whether U.S. actions—specifically the mining of Nicaraguan 
ports, the attacks on oil installations, and arming and training the contras—violated the 
prohibition of the threat or use of force.  The ICJ rejected Nicaragua’s claim that the U.S.-
Honduran military maneuvers violated the prohibition.310  Nevertheless, the ICJ found that 
the United States had committed a prima facie violation of the prohibition, but that not all 
of the assistance the United States provided constituted a violation of the prohibition, 
especially the financing of the contras.311  In order to justify its actions under the doctrine 
of collective self-defense, the United States had to establish that an armed attack had 
occurred against El Salvador, Honduras, or Costa Rica.312  The ICJ found that Nicaragua’s 
provision of arms to rebel groups did not constitute an armed attack, thus rejecting the 
claim that an armed attack had occurred on El Salvador.313  Moreover, in spite of having 
found that Nicaragua committed cross-border incursions against Costa Rica and Honduras 
from 1982–1984, the ICJ found that no armed attacks had occurred, relying on those states 
not explicitly declaring that they had suffered an armed attack or invoking the right of 
collective self-defense in their statements to international bodies.314  The ICJ also noted 
that the United States’s failure to declare to the Security Council that it was acting in 
collective self-defense indicated that the claim was not legitimate.315  Additionally, the ICJ 
found that even assuming a Nicaraguan armed attack against El Salvador had occurred, the 
United States’s actions failed the international humanitarian law constraints of necessity 
and proportionality.316  The ICJ thus concluded that the United States had violated the 
customary international law prohibition of the threat or use of force.317 
Next, the ICJ found that “the support given by the United States, up to the end of 
September 1984, to the military and paramilitary activities of the contras in Nicaragua, by 
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financial support, training, supply of weapons, intelligence and logistic support, constitutes 
a clear breach of the principle of non-intervention.”318  The unlawful support included the 
humanitarian aid provided by statute, for the ICJ found that for aid to truly be humanitarian, 
it must be given without discrimination—the aid at issue was only given to the contras.319  
The ICJ refused to find that the withdrawal of economic aid, the reduction of the sugar 
quota, and the trade embargo constituted a breach of the customary international law 
principle of non-intervention.320  The ICJ rejected the implied U.S. defense that its actions 
were an exception to the principle of non-intervention on the basis that Nicaragua had 
intervened in the affairs of Costa Rica, El Salvador, and Honduras.321  Having found that 
Nicaragua’s actions did not constitute an armed attack, the ICJ stated that the United States 
was not permitted to respond by the use of force.322 
As to violations of Nicaragua’s sovereignty, the ICJ considered only the allegations 
of U.S. attacks on Nicaraguan territory, incursions into Nicaragua’s territorial sea, and 
overflights.323  The ICJ concluded that “the principle of respect for territorial sovereignty 
inevitably overlap with those of the principles of the prohibition of the use of force and of 
non-intervention.”324  Thus the mining of Nicaraguan ports and the attacks on Nicaraguan 
installations violated Nicaragua’s sovereignty.325  Additionally, the overflights constituted 
a violation of Nicaragua’s airspace.326  These actions were similarly not excused by 
Nicaragua’s actions in Costa Rica, El Salvador, or Honduras.327  Moreover, the mining of 
Nicaraguan ports was a violation of the customary international law rights of freedom of 
communications and of maritime commerce.328 
Turning to customary international humanitarian law, the ICJ noted that Nicaragua 
had only alleged that the contras’ violations of international humanitarian law were 
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imputable to the United States.329  The ICJ had found the evidence insufficient to establish 
that claim.330  In spite of that finding, the ICJ concluded that the United States was “bound 
to refrain from encouragement of persons or groups engaged in the conflict in Nicaragua 
to commit violations of Article 3 which is common to all four Geneva Conventions of 12 
August 1949.”331  The publication and dissemination of the Psychological Operations 
manual violated that obligation.332 
The ICJ next examined whether Nicaragua’s conduct justified any 
countermeasures.333  In analyzing Nicaragua’s promises to the Organization of American 
States, the ICJ noted that a state may undertake binding international obligations relating 
to issues of domestic policy that are exclusively within the state’s sovereign prerogative.334  
Nevertheless the ICJ found that Nicaragua had not undertaken any binding international 
obligation in its communications with the Organization of American States.335  Even if an 
obligation had been incurred, Nicaragua would have owed it to the Organization of 
American States and not to the United States—thus Nicaragua’s failure to uphold its 
obligations would not have justified U.S. countermeasures.336  Moreover, the Sandinista 
creation of a totalitarian government could not justify countermeasures as the structure of 
domestic government falls within states’ sovereignty.337  Similar considerations, the ICJ 
found, applied to a state’s conduct of its foreign relations.338  Finally, the ICJ noted that no 
provision of general international law regulated the level of armaments a state could 
maintain.339 
In analyzing the 1956 Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation between the 
United States and Nicaragua, the ICJ found that the mining of Nicaraguan ports and the 
attacks on Nicaraguan oil installations defeated the object and purpose of the treaty, as did 
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the imposition of a general trade embargo.340  The mining of Nicaraguan ports also violated 
the treaty’s provisions on freedom of navigation and commerce.341  The 90% cut of the 
sugar quota, the cessation of economic aid, and the U.S. actions with international loaning 
institutions, however, did not violate the treaty’s object and purpose.342  The ICJ observed 
once again that it could not impute the contras’ actions to the United States, and so rejected 
Nicaragua’s claims under the treaty insofar as they alleged that the United States controlled 
and directed the contras.343 
The ICJ determined that it must address whether U.S. conduct fell under the treaty’s 
exceptions for measures necessary to protect U.S. essential security interests.344  The 
precise timing of each action had to be considered in order to determine if it satisfied the 
treaty’s exception.345  In light of the whole circumstances, the ICJ stated that the mining of 
Nicaraguan ports and attacks on Nicaraguan installations “cannot possibly be justified as 
‘necessary’ to protect the essential security interests of the United States.”346  While the 
trade embargo subjectively satisfied the treaty’s exception, given that Reagan’s May 1, 
1985 statement on the threats of Nicaragua, the United States had failed to provide evidence 
that the embargo was necessary to protect its essential interests.347 
Finally, the ICJ considered the issue of compensation.  The ICJ determined that it 
had jurisdiction to determine the nature and amount of reparation due to Nicaragua in a 
later proceeding.348  But the ICJ rejected Nicaragua’s claim for 370,200,000 USD as the 
minimum valuation of direct damages.349  The ICJ noted that it should avoid making 
awards of this kind except in exceptional circumstances where the entitlement of the 
awarded state “was already established with certainty and precision.”350  The ICJ also 
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observed that such an award could potentially be an obstacle to a friendly settlement of the 
dispute.351 
The ICJ concluded that, in light of these violations, the United States “is under a 
duty immediately to cease and to refrain from all such acts as my constitute breaches of the 
foregoing legal obligations.”352  The ICJ held that the United States was to make necessary 
reparations for its breaches of customary international law and the 1956 Treaty of 
Friendship, Commerce and Navigation.353  If the United States and Nicaragua were unable 
to agree on the appropriate reparation, the ICJ would decide it in a subsequent procedure.354 
 
b. The Territorial Dispute 
 
i. Procedure 
 
On August 31, 1990, the Government of the Great Socialist People’s Libyan Arab 
Jamahiriya (“Libya”) filed a notification in the ICJ Registry which contained an annexed 
copy of an agreement called “Framework Agreement [Accord-Cadre] on the Peaceful 
Settlement of the Territorial Dispute between the Great Socialist People’s Libyan Arab 
Jamahiriya and the Republic of Chad” (the “Accord-Cadre”).355  The Accord-Cadre 
provided that Libya the Republic of Chad (“Chad”) would attempt to resolve their 
territorial disputes peacefully within one year, unless their respective heads of state decided 
otherwise.356  Failing that, both states would submit the dispute to the ICJ.357  Accordingly, 
Libya requested the ICJ to resolve the territorial dispute with regards to the applicable 
international law, as a year had expired since the Accord-Cadre had been signed and the 
heads of state had been unable to reach an agreement to vary the procedures for 
resolution.358 
On September 3, 1990, Chad filed an Application with the ICJ to institute 
proceedings against Libya on the basis of the Accord-Cadre.359  Chad requested that the 
ICJ “determine the course of the frontier between the Republic of Chad and the Libyan 
Arab Jamahiriya, in accordance with the principles and rules of international law applicable 
in the matter as between the parties.”360  The states agreed that each filing referred to the 
same matter, and the ICJ proceeded to order the dates of various filings, each of which was 
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timely met.361  Chad filed additional documents past the closure of the written proceedings, 
but Libya did not object to those filings.362  The public hearings were held between June 
14 and July 14, 1993.363 
In its August 31, 1990 notification, Libya stated “[t]he determination of the limits 
of the respective territories of the Parties in this region involves, inter alia, a consideration 
of a series of international agreements although, in the view of Libya, none of these 
agreements finally fixed the boundary between the Parties which, accordingly, remains to 
be established in accordance with the applicable principles of international law.”364  On 
that basis, Libya requested the ICJ “to decide the limits of [the parties’] respective 
territories in accordance with the rules of international law applicable in the matter.”365  
Libya argued that while no boundary existed as a result of any international agreement, 
Libya had “clear title” to lands north of a line that matched the 15º0’N line for much of its 
length.366  Libya based its claim to the disputed area “on a coalescence of rights and titles:  
those of the indigenous inhabitants, those of the Senoussi Order (a religious confraternity 
. . . ), and those of a succession of sovereign States, namely the Ottoman Empire, Italy, and 
finally Libya itself.”367 
Chad, in its September 3, 1990 Application, noted that the purpose of the dispute 
was “to arrive at a firm definition of [the] frontier” and on that basis requested the ICJ “to 
determine the course of the frontier between the Republic of Chad and the Libyan Arab 
Jamahiriya.”368  Chad argued that the boundary should be determined on the basis of the 
1955 Treaty of Friendship and Good Neighbourliness (the “1955 Treaty”), which was 
concluded between the French Republic—Chad claimed it was its successor in the treaty—
and the United Kingdom of Libya.369  In the alternative, Chad claimed that the boundaries 
referred to in the 1955 Treaty had acquired the character of boundaries through French 
effectivités370 and that Chad could rely on those effectivités.371 
The ICJ noted that both Libya and Chad’s requests revealed a fundamental 
disagreement about the nature of the dispute.372  On the one hand, Libya argued that no 
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boundary existed and asked the ICJ to determine that boundary.373  On the other hand, Chad 
presumed a boundary existed and requested the ICJ to determine its precise limits.374 
The map below shows the exact lines that both Chad and Libya claimed, while the 
following map is more detailed and shows the state of Chad today.
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Figure 1:  The Territorial Dispute (Libya Arab Jamahiriya v. Chad), Judgment, 1994 I.C.J. 6, page 16 (Feb. 3). 
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Figure 2:  Perry-Castañeda Library Map Collection, http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/africa/chad_rel_1991.pdf. 
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ii. Facts 
 
“The dispute between the Parties is set against the background of a long and 
complex history of military, diplomatic and administrative activity on the part of the 
Ottoman Empire, France, Great Britain and Italy, as well as the Senoussi Order.”375  Libya 
became a sovereign state on December 24, 1951.376  Prior to then, Libya had been 
administered by France, the United Kingdom, the United States, and the Union of Soviet 
Socialist Republics following the end of World War II.377  Chad had been a French colony 
in French Equatorial Africa—it gained its independence on August 11, 1960.378 
In Africa, the 19th and early 20th centuries were characterized by numerous 
agreements between foreign powers seeking to delimit their spheres of influence following 
the Scramble for Africa.379  The following are the agreements relevant to the dispute: 
 
• The 1898 Convention:  An agreement between France and Great Britain 
that, following an 1899 Declaration, established French territory north 
of the 15º0’N line would be delimited by a specified line, presumably 
that attached to the Livre jaune the French published a few days after 
the 1898 Convention’s adoption.380 
• The 1900 and 1902 Letters:  An exchange of letters between France and 
Italy in which Italy was reassured that “the limit to French expansion in 
North Africa . . . is to be taken as corresponding to the frontier of 
Tripolitania as shown on [the Livre jaune].”381 
• The 1910 Convention:  An agreement between the Tunisian government 
and the Ottoman Empire delimiting the frontier between the Regency of 
Tunis and the Vilayet of Tripoli.382  Following the Treaties of Ouchy 
and Lausanne in October 15 and 18, 1912 respectively, Italy established 
sovereignty over the Turkish provinces of Tripolitania and Cyrenaica.383 
• The 1919 Convention:  A supplementary agreement to the 1898 
Convention between France and Great Britain recording an 
interpretation of the 1899 Declaration.384 
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• The 1919 Agreement:  An agreement between France and Italy that 
established the boundary between Tripolitania and the French African 
possessions west of Toummo.385 
• The 1924 Protocol:  An amendment to the 1923 Treaty of Lausanne—
which established peace between Turkey, France, Great Britain, and 
Italy—that established the boundary between French Equatorial Africa 
and the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan.386 
• The unratified 1935 Treaty:  An agreement that never came into force 
between France and Italy, which established a boundary between Libya 
and the adjacent French colonies east of Toummo.387 
• The 1955 Treaty:  An agreement between a newly-independent Libya 
and France that dealt with a variety of matters, particularly border 
frontiers.388  Article 3 of the treaty claimed “the frontiers between the 
territories of Tunisia, Algeria, French West Africa and French 
Equatorial Africa . . . and . . . Libya . . . result from international 
instruments in force on the date of [Libya’s] constitution . . . as listed in 
the attached Exchange of Letters (Ann. I).”389  Annex I listed 1898 
Convention; the 1899 Declaration; the 1900 and 1902 Letters; the 1919 
Convention; and the 1919 Agreement.390 
 
The dispute focused on ownership of the Aouzou strip, an area thought to be rich in 
minerals391 that had been occupied by Libya in 1973 and annexed in 1975.392  Chad and 
Libya had been at war for control of the Aouzou strip from 1986 to 1987.393  While the 
Aouzou strip had no military or strategic value, Chad and Libya fiercely contested 
ownership over the area.394  Libya funded anti-Chad opposition groups, invaded Chadian 
territory, and even sought the replacement of Chad’s government with a more Libya-
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friendly regime.395  The Organization of African Unity (the “OAU”) backed Chad’s claim 
to the Aouzou strip, and coerced Libya to withdraw many of its troops from the area by 
threatening to cancel a summit scheduled to take in Tripoli in 1982.396  In 1983, the Soviet 
Union, which backed Libya, blocked a Chadian appeal to the Security Council calling for 
Libya’s withdraw from the Aouzou strip.397  After Chad succeeded in driving Libya out of 
much of northern Chad but not the Aouzou strip in 1987, the parties concluded the Cadre-
Accord which led to the ICJ case.398 
Both Libya and Chad argued that the “logical starting-point” for the dispute’s 
resolution was the 1955 Treaty.399  While Libya never argued that the 1955 Treaty was 
invalid, it asserted that the ICJ should take into account that France had taken advantage of 
Libya’s lack of knowledge of the relevant facts and Libya’s inexperience in concluding 
these types of agreements.400 
 
iii. Judgment 
 
The ICJ reviewed the 1955 Treaty through the lens of the 1969 Vienna Convention 
on the Law of Treaties by first determining its object and purpose.401  It found that Libya 
and France had intended to finally settle all boundary disputes in the 1955 Treaty.402  The 
ICJ also rejected Libya’s assertion that, of the treaties listed in Annex I, only the 1910 
Convention and the 1919 Agreement produced binding frontiers.403  The ICJ found that 
article 3 of the 1955 Treaty also established which agreements were in force at the time, 
specifically excluding the 1935 Treaty.404  The ICJ next reviewed the context of the 1955 
Treaty, finding that the 1955 Convention of Good Neighbourliness between France and 
Libya implicitly recognized that cities north of Libya’s claim lay in French territory.405  
The ICJ also considered that the travaux préparatoires of the 1955 Treaty established that 
Libya and France had intended to definitively establish their frontier.406 
The ICJ then reviewed the treaties referenced in Annex I.  It found that the 1919 
Convention, which interpreted the 1899 Declaration that established the lines drawn in the 
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Livre jaune, definitively established the boundary between Libya and Chad in the 
dispute.407  The 1919 Convention thus established the boundary from 19º30’N, 24º00’E to 
23º27’N, 16º00’E—the northernmost point of Chad.408  The ICJ found that the 1900 and 
1902 Letters determined the remaining boundary to be from 23º27’N, 16º00’E to 23º00’N, 
15º00’E.409 
The ICJ also held that, in spite of article 11 of the 1955 Treaty that established the 
date of expiration of the treaty, the boundary created by the treaty was to be permanent:  
“The establishment of this boundary is a fact which, from the outset has had a legal life of 
its own, independently of the fate of the 1955 Treaty . . . .  A boundary established by treaty 
thus achieves a permanence which the treaty itself does not necessarily enjoy.”410 
The ICJ was extremely careful to base its findings exclusively on the 1955 Treaty 
and made no findings on the other arguments presented by the parties.411 
 
c. Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo 
 
i. Procedure 
 
On June 23, 1999, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (the “DRC”) filed an 
Application with the ICJ alleging that the Republic of Uganda (“Uganda”) had committed 
acts of armed aggression on the DRC’s territory in violation of the UN Charter and the 
Charter of the Organization of African Unity.412  The DRC requested that the ICJ find that: 
 
(1)  Uganda had committed an act of aggression according to ICJ case law 
and UN General Assembly Resolution 3314 and in contravention of 
article 2(4) of the UN Charter; 
(2) Uganda had committed repeated violations of the Geneva Conventions 
and their Additional Protocols, as well as “massive human rights 
violations in defiance of the most basic customary law;” 
(3) Uganda was responsible for heavy losses of life in the area surrounding 
the city of Kinshasa [the DRC’s capital] due to its forcible possession 
of the Inga hydroelectric dam and its termination of the dams power 
generation; 
(4) Uganda had caused the death of 40 civilians by shooting down a Boeing 
727 at Kindu on October 9, 1998, in violation of the Convention on 
International Civil Aviation, the Hague Convention for the Suppression 
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of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, and the Montreal Convention for the 
Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil Aviation.413 
 
The DRC requested that the ICJ order that Ugandan armed forces vacate the DRC’s 
territory, that Uganda immediately and unconditionally withdraw its nationals from the 
DRC’s territory, and that Uganda provide the DRC with compensation for the looting, 
destruction, removal of property and persons, and all other unlawful acts attributable to 
Uganda.414  As a basis for jurisdiction, the DRC invoked the ICJ’s compulsory jurisdiction 
under article 36(2) of the ICJ Statute.415 
On June 19, 2000, the DRC requested the ICJ implement several provisional 
measures: 
 
(1) Uganda must order its army to withdraw from Kisangani; 
(2) Uganda must cease all fighting or military activity within the DRC and 
must immediately withdraw from the DRC’s territory, in addition to 
halting any direct or indirect support to any state, group, organization, 
movement, or individual engaged in military activity against the DRC; 
(3) Uganda must take all measures to stop war crimes from being 
committed by entities or persons under its authority, which enjoy its 
support, or could be under its control, authority, or influence; 
(4) Uganda must stop any act aiming or causing the disruption or 
interference of the fundamental human rights of persons within 
occupied zones; 
(5) Uganda must stop the illegal exploitation of the DRC’s natural resources 
and the illegal transfer of assets, equipment, or persons to its territory; 
and 
(6) Uganda must respect the DRC’s sovereignty, political independence, 
territorial integrity, and the fundamental rights of persons within the 
DRC’s territory.416 
 
The ICJ ordered that both parties refrain from any action, particularly armed action, 
that might prejudice the rights of the other party with respect to whatever judgment the ICJ 
might render or that might aggravate or extend the dispute before the ICJ.417  The ICJ also 
ordered that both parties take all measures to comply with their international obligations 
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under the UN Charter, the Charter of the Organization of African Unity, and Security 
Council Resolution 1304.418  Finally, the ICJ ordered that both parties take measures to 
ensure the full respect for fundamental human rights within the zone of conflict, as well as 
to comply with international humanitarian law.419 
The DRC filed its Memorial on July 6, 2000.420  In the Memorial, the DRC alleged 
that Uganda had engaged in military and paramilitary activities against the DRC, had 
occupied the DRC’s territory, and had actively extended military, logistic, economic, and 
financial support to armed opposition groups with the DRC.421  These actions, the DRC 
alleged, violated the prohibition on the use of force (including the prohibition of 
aggression), the obligation to peacefully settle international disputes, the DRC’s 
sovereignty, its peoples’ rights to self-determination, and the principle of non-
interference.422  The DRC also alleged that Uganda, in illegally exploiting the DRC’s 
natural resources, violated the DRC’s sovereignty over its natural resources, the DRC’s 
peoples’ rights to self-determination, and the principle of non-interference.423  Further, the 
DRC alleged that Uganda had committed acts of oppression against DRC nationals by 
killing, injuring, abducting, and despoiling them.424  The DRC argued these actions 
violated the obligation to respect fundamental human rights in armed conflict and the civil, 
political, economic, social, and cultural rights of DRC nationals.425 
The DRC requested the ICJ find that Uganda should cease its internationally 
wrongful acts in the DRC’s territory, including support for armed opposition groups, the 
unlawful detention of DRC nationals, and the illegal exploitation of the DRC’s natural 
resources.426  The DRC also requested the ICJ require Uganda to pay reparations for all 
wrongful acts attributable to Uganda and to restore DRC resources in its possession.427  
Failing that, the DRC requested the ICJ require Uganda to make a payment to the DRC 
covering the totality of the damage the DRC suffered.428  Finally, the DRC requested the 
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ICJ require Uganda to render satisfaction to the DRC in the form of official apologies, the 
payment of damages, and the prosecution of those responsible for Uganda’s wrongful acts, 
as well as requiring Uganda to make specific guarantees and assurances that it would not 
commit similar violations against the DRC in the future.429 
Uganda filed its Counter-Memorial on April 21, 2001, which included several 
counter-claims.430  Uganda argued that the ICJ should find the DRC’s allegations of all 
violations of international law that involved Rwanda or its agents are inadmissible because 
Rwanda was not involved in the suit.431  On this basis, Uganda argued that the ICJ should 
refuse to exercise jurisdiction, even if it had it, in order to preserve the ICJ’s “judicial 
function.”432  Uganda also requested the ICJ reject the DRC’s accusations that Uganda had 
violated international law.433  Uganda then requested the ICJ uphold Uganda’s counter-
claims against the DRC: 
 
(1) The DRC had violated the prohibition of the use of force against 
Uganda; 
(2) The DRC had intervened in Uganda’s domestic affairs; and 
(3) The DRC had provided assistance to armed groups carrying out military 
and paramilitary activities against Uganda by training, equipping, 
financing, and supplying those groups.434 
 
Finally, Uganda requested the ICJ determine reparations for its counter-claims in a later 
proceeding.435 
The DRC challenged the admissibility of Uganda’s counter-claims via written 
observations filed with the ICJ on June 28, 2001.436  The DRC requested the ICJ dismiss 
Uganda’s counter-claims because (1) they were not presented in the manner required by 
the Rules of the Court; (2) there was not a “direct connection” with the DRC’s allegations 
against Uganda, as the counter-claims dealt with matters that occurred prior to the events 
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of the DRC’s claims; and (3) entertaining the counter-claims would be contrary to 
administration of justice.437 
Uganda filed its written observations in support of its counter-claims on August 15, 
2001.438  Uganda requested that the ICJ find its counter-claims complied with the Statute 
of the ICJ and that the ICJ reject the DRC’s claims in its written observations on Uganda’s 
counterclaims.439 
In a November 29, 2001 order, the ICJ held that the first two counter-claims were 
admissible, but the third was not.440  The ICJ ordered that the DRC file a Reply and Uganda 
file a Rejoinder addressing Uganda’s counter-claims.441 
On May 29, 2002, the DRC filed its Reply.442  In the Reply, the DRC essentially 
restated the requests it made in its Memorial.443  The DRC added that the ICJ should find 
that Uganda had also violated the principle of distinction, which requires armed forces to 
distinguish between civilian and military objectives during an armed conflict.444  The DRC 
also responded the Uganda’s counter-claims.  The DRC requested the ICJ dismiss 
Uganda’s claim that the DRC had participated in armed attacks against Uganda because 
the claim occurred before Laurent-Désiré Kabila came to power, Uganda had waived its 
right to raise the claim, and Uganda had failed to establish the facts of the claim.445  
Additionally, the DRC argued that Uganda had failed to establish the facts of the claim for 
the period following when Laurent-Désiré Kabila came to power.446  As to the second 
counter-claim, which alleged the DRC was involved in an attack on the Ugandan embassy 
and on Ugandan nationals in Kinshasa, the DRC requested the ICJ dismiss the claim 
because Uganda had failed to establish that the injured persons were Ugandan nationals 
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and that they had exhausted domestic remedies, as well as failing to establish the facts of 
its claim.447  Additionally, the DRC requested the ICJ dismiss Uganda’s claim that the DRC 
was involved in an attack on Uganda’s embassy because Uganda had failed to establish the 
facts of that claim.448 
On December 6, 2002, Uganda filed its Rejoinder.449  Uganda reiterated its request 
presented in its Counter-Memorial that the ICJ find the DRC’s claims involving Rwanda 
inadmissible.450  Uganda also requested that the ICJ reject the DRC’s claims that Uganda 
had violated international law.451  Uganda requested the ICJ uphold the counter-claims 
presented in Uganda’s Counter-Memorial.452  Lastly, Uganda repeated its request that the 
ICJ award reparations for its counter-claims in a later proceeding.453 
On February 28, 2003, the DRC filed a document titled “Additional Written 
Observations of the Democratic Republic of the Congo on the Counter-Claims Submitted 
by Uganda” (“Additional Written Observations”).454  In that document, the DRC once 
again challenged Uganda’s counter-claims: 
 
As regards the first counter-claim presented by Uganda: 
(1) to the extent that it relates to the period before Laurent-Désiré Kabila 
came to power, the claim is inadmissible because Uganda had 
previously waived it right to lodge such a claim and, in the alternative, 
the claim is unfounded because Uganda has failed to establish the facts 
on which it is based; 
(2) to the extent that it relates to the period from when Laurent-Désiré 
Kabila came to power until the onset of Ugandan aggression, the claim 
is unfounded in fact because Uganda has failed to establish the facts 
on which it is based; 
(3) to the extent that it relates to the period after the onset of Ugandan 
aggression, the claim is founded neither in fact nor in law because 
Uganda has failed to establish the facts on which it is based, and 
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because, from 2 August 1998, the DRC was in any event in a situation 
of self-defence. 
As regards the second counter-claim presented by Uganda: 
(1) to the extent that it is now centred on the interpretation and application 
of the Vienna Convention of 1961 on Diplomatic Relations, the claim 
presented by Uganda radically modifies the subject-matter of the 
dispute, contrary to the Statute and Rules of Court; this aspect of the 
claim must therefore be dismissed from the present proceedings; 
(2) the aspect of the claim relating to the inhumane treatment allegedly 
suffered by certain Ugandan nationals remains inadmissible, as 
Uganda has still not shown that the conditions laid down by 
international law for the exercise of its diplomatic protection have 
been met; in the alternative, this aspect of the claim is unfounded, as 
Uganda is still unable to establish the factual and legal bases for its 
claims; 
(3) the aspect of the claim relating to the alleged expropriation of Ugandan 
public property is unfounded, as Uganda is still unable to establish the 
factual and legal bases for its claims.455 
 
The oral proceedings were held between April 11 and 29, 2005.456  During the oral 
proceedings, the DRC reiterated the requests it made in its Reply and its Additional Written 
Observations.457  Similarly, Uganda reiterated the requests it made in its Rejoinder.458 
 
ii. Facts 
 
(1) The Historical Context 
 
The underlying case arose in the origins and aftermaths of the First and Second 
Congo Wars, which occurred July 1996 through July 1998 and August 2, 1998 through 
July 2003 respectively.459  The DRC, formerly known as Zaire, gained its independence in 
1960.460  Tensions existed in Zaire between the “indigenous” groups—composed of the 
Hunde, Nande, and Nyanga communities—and the Banyarwanda “immigrant” groups—
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composed of refugees from Rwanda.461  On March 20, 1993, the governor of the DRC’s 
North Kivu province called on Zairian security forces to join with the Hunde and Nyanga 
in order to exterminate the Banyarwanda, resulting in 500 civilian deaths at the Ntoto 
market.462  Violence continued over several months as Hunde and Nyanga groups, 
sometimes called the Mai-Mai, continued killing the Banyarwanda, which included both 
Hutus and Tutsis.463  The Zairian Armed Forces (the “FAZ”) began assisting Hutu-armed 
units in targeting Hunde civilians in retaliation.464  Thousands were killed and up to a 
quarter of a million were displaced as a result of the violence.465 
North Kivu became relatively stable by February 1994, but violence erupted again 
as the Rwandan Patriotic Front (the “RPF”) began gaining ground against the Rwandan 
Armed Forces (the “FAR”) and the Interahamwe, the main perpetrators of the Rwandan 
Genocide, which caused over 700,000 Rwandan refugees to flee into North Kivu.466  
Among the refugees were members of the FAR and Interahamwe.467  While the local 
Congolese nationals began uniting to oppose the Rwandan refugees, who had been causing 
concerns about damage to the local ecology and the socio-economic and security 
conditions of the locals, Zairian President Mobuto Sese Seko’s response was nugatory.468  
It is possible that Mobuto had been supplying arms to the FAR to encourage their attacks 
in Rwanda.469  Between July 1994 and mid-1996, ex-members of the FAR and other armed 
groups had been staging attacks in Rwanda from North Kivu.470  By late 1995, the Hunde 
and Nyanga had organized militias that initiated bloody attacks on Hutu communities, 
following an announcement by Zaire that all Rwandan refugees would be expelled from 
UN refugee camps.471  In spring 1996, full-scale ethnic violence dominated North Kivu 
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and South Kivu.472  The FAZ launched two campaigns to restore order, but both failed.473  
During this period, between 6,000 and 40,000 people died and 400,000 people were 
displaced.474 
In October 1996, the First Congo War began as large-scale violence erupted in 
South Kivu in response to the brutal suppression of the Banyamulenge, ethnic Tutsis who 
were DRC nationals.475  The violence was widely recognized as a full-scale civil war in 
Zaire.476  During the civil war, Angola, Rwanda, and Uganda directly intervened in Zaire’s 
territory to combat various armed opposition groups that had used the DRC’s instability to 
launch cross-border attacks into each state.477  While Zaire accused the RPF of causing the 
initial violence, the armed opposition group the Alliance of Democratic Forces for the 
Liberation of the Congo (the “AFDL”) took credit for creating the uprising.478 
During the First Congo War, the AFDL, the RPF, and Uganda’s military, the 
Uganda Peoples’ Defence Forces (the “UPDF”), targeted UN refugee camps that were 
being used as safe havens for armed insurgents.479  By November 1996, the AFDL and 
RPF had seized the three major Zairian towns along the Rwandan border:  Uvira, Bukavu, 
and Goma.480  The AFDL was largely supported by the RPF—both forces were responsible 
for mass atrocities against Hutu refugees.481  The UPDF and the Angolan military also 
assisted the AFDL.482 
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On May 16, 1997, Mobuto fled the capital and Laurent-Désiré Kabila, the head of 
the AFDL, declared himself President.483  On May 29, 1997, Kabila officially became the 
President of Zaire, which was renamed the DRC.484  While relative peace returned to the 
DRC, violence continued in the east, especially in North and South Kivu.485  The DRC 
entered into several security agreements with Burundi, Rwanda and Uganda.486  By 
September 1997, the DRC’s military, the Congolese Armed Forces (the “FAC”), acted 
under command of the RPF in the eastern DRC.487  Frequently, the RPF acted unilaterally 
to combat unnamed Tutsi armed groups, which resulted in massive civilian deaths, in 
retaliation for frequent cross-border attacks.488  The DRC also granted permission to the 
UPDF to operate in the eastern DRC, at times unilaterally, to combat armed opposition 
groups targeting Uganda.489 
Tensions once again grew in the eastern DRC as locals became dissatisfied with 
the prolonged presence of foreign troops.490  The Tutsi RPF and the Banyamulenge in the 
FAC began to refuse orders given by non-Tutsi officers.491  When Kabila deployed other 
contingents of the FAC to dilute the Tutsi presence in the eastern DRC, the Tutsis and non-
Tutsis began to violently clash.492  As a result, the non-Tutsi officers became increasingly 
hesitant to attack the Tutsi’s enemies, the Mai-Mai, ex-FAR members, and Interahamwe 
rebels, at times even tacitly aiding those groups.493  It was amidst these tensions in 1998 
that the Second Congo War began.  The dispute before the ICJ focused on the events of the 
Second Congo War.  It is important to keep in mind that while this case is against Uganda, 
Rwanda was also heavily involved in attacks against the DRC, at times coordinating with 
Uganda and various rebel groups.494  It is also important to acknowledge the human 
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suffering of the Second Congo War:  Approximately four million people died and another 
four million were displaced.495 
 
(2) Military and Paramilitary Activities in the DRC 
 
The DRC argued that by the end of July 1998, Kabila had learned that the Chief of 
Staff of the FAC, Colonel Kaberebe, a Rwandan national, was planning a coup d’état.496  
On July 28, 1998, Kabila published an official statement calling for the withdrawal of all 
foreign troops from Congolese territory, though it was primarily addressed to Rwandan 
troops.497  The DRC alleged that on August 2, 1998, the 10th Brigade of the FAC rebelled 
against the DRC in North Kivu, assisted by Rwandan soldiers.498  The DRC asserted that 
on August 4, 1998, Rwanda and Uganda organized an airborne operation to fly troops from 
Goma—on the DRC-Rwanda border—to Kitona, a town approximately 190 miles 
southwest of Kinshasa.499  The DRC argued that Rwandan and Ugandan forces occupied 
the Inga Dam, which provided hydroelectric power to Kinshasa.500 
The DRC also alleged that Rwanda and Uganda created the Congolese Rally for 
Democracy (the “RCD”) on August 12, 1998 and the Congo Liberation Movement (the 
“MLC”), which included its military wing the Congo Liberation Army (the “ALC”), at the 
end of September 1998.501  The DRC argued that Uganda cooperated with the ALC to 
produce a united military front, by providing tactical support, recruitment, education, 
training, equipment, and supplies.502 
During the Victoria Falls Summit, August 7–8, 1998, members of the Southern 
African Development Community (the “SADC”) condemned the aggression suffered by 
the DRC and the occupation of its territory.503  As a result of the SADC efforts, the DRC 
and Uganda concluded the Sirte Peace Agreement, which required Uganda to cease 
hostilities and withdraw from the DRC’s territory.504  On July 10, 1999, Angola, the DRC, 
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Namibia, Rwanda, Ugandan, and Zimbabwe signed the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement.505  
The Lusaka Agreement required an immediate cessation of hostilities and the withdrawal 
of foreign forces from the DRC’s territory.506  Through further efforts, Uganda signed the 
Kampala plan on April 8, 2000 and the Harare plan on December 6, 2000, both of which 
provided for troop disengagement.507  The DRC alleged that, in spite of these agreements, 
Uganda continued to provide arms to ethnic groups in the Ituri region along the DRC-
Uganda border.508 
Uganda argued that its presence in the eastern DRC prior to Mobuto’s downfall was 
based on Kabila’s invitation to attack anti-Ugandan insurgents and to secure the border 
region, which the DRC did not have the resources to do.509  Following the invitation, 
Uganda sent three UPDF battalions into the eastern DRC.510  Kabila’s invitation was made 
official in the 1998 Protocol on Security Along the Common Border.511  Uganda alleged 
that after breaking its alliance with Uganda in July 1998, Kabila established alliances with 
Chad, the Sudan, and anti-Ugandan insurgent groups.512  Uganda argued that the July 28, 
1998 statement called only for the withdrawal of Rwandan troops in the DRC and thus did 
not apply to Ugandan forces.513  Uganda also argued that it did not participate in the FAC 
rebellion nor the attempted coup d’état.514  Uganda denied that it participated in the attack 
on the Kitona military base or had troops board planes flying to Kitona.515 
Uganda did acknowledge, however, that by August 1998 it had sent troops into the 
DRC to defend itself against an attack planned by Sudanese forces.516  By July 3, 1999, 
Uganda “gain[ed] control of the strategic airfields and river ports in northern and eastern 
Congo in order to stop the combined forces of the Congolese and Sudanese armies as well 
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as the anti-Ugandan insurgent groups from reaching Uganda’s borders.”517  Uganda argued 
that neither the Lusaka Peace Agreement, the Kampala plan, nor the Harare plan called for 
immediate withdrawal of Ugandan troops, but Uganda began withdrawing five battalions 
from the DRC on June 22, 2000, while withdrawing two more battalions on February 20, 
2001.518  On September 6, 2002, Uganda noted that the DRC and Uganda signed the 
Luanda Agreement, which required Uganda to withdraw all its troops except for those 
expressly authorized to remain on the slopes of Mr. Rewenzori.519  Uganda claimed it 
fulfilled its obligations by June 2003 and had not deployed troops inside the Congo since 
then.520  Uganda did not deny providing political and military assistance to the MLC and 
RCD, but it denied participating in the formation of those groups.521 
 
(3) Use of Force in Kitona 
 
The ICJ next turned to the issue of the use of force in Kitona, which was discussed 
above.  While the DRC alleged that Uganda participated in an assault on the military base 
in Kitona, Uganda denied that its troops were even present.522  Specifically, the DRC 
alleged that three airplanes in Goma were boarded by other states’ armed forces, including 
Uganda’s, on August 4, 1998.523  The planes flew to Kigali, where they refueled and 
acquired ammunition, and then proceeded to Kitona.524  The DRC alleged that during the 
ensuing battles, Uganda seized Kitona, Boma, Matadi, and Inga, as well as the Inga Dam 
with the ultimate goal of taking Kinshasa and overthrowing Kabila.525 
 
(4) Military Action in the East DRC 
 
Uganda acknowledged that three battalions of UPDF troops were present in the 
eastern DRC as of August 1, 1998 and that it had reinforced those battalions throughout 
                                                          
517 Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Uganda), Judgment, 2005 I.C.J. 
168, para. 39 (Dec. 19). 
518 Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Uganda), Judgment, 2005 I.C.J. 
168, para. 40 (Dec. 19). 
519 Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Uganda), Judgment, 2005 I.C.J. 
168, para. 40 (Dec. 19). 
520 Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Uganda), Judgment, 2005 I.C.J. 
168, para. 40 (Dec. 19). 
521 Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Uganda), Judgment, 2005 I.C.J. 
168, para. 41 (Dec. 19). 
522 Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Uganda), Judgment, 2005 I.C.J. 
168, paras. 55–56 (Dec. 19). 
523 Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Uganda), Judgment, 2005 I.C.J. 
168, para. 62 (Dec. 19). 
524 Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Uganda), Judgment, 2005 I.C.J. 
168, para. 62 (Dec. 19). 
525 Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Uganda), Judgment, 2005 I.C.J. 
168, para. 62 (Dec. 19). 
65 
 
the conflict.526  Between August 1998 and November July 10, 1999, UPDF forces took 
control of or traversed through a large number of DRC towns in the area.527  There was 
“considerable controversy” over whether UPDF forces seized towns after July 10, 1999 
because the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement took effect on that date.528  The ICJ accepted that 
UPDF forces had seized the vast majority of the towns, but concluded that it did not have 
sufficient evidence that Ugandan forces were present at Bomongo, Bururu, Mobenzene, or 
Moboza during that period.529  The DRC asserted that Uganda had occupied one-third of 
the DRC and that Ugandan forces did not leave until April 2003.530 
Uganda argued that its actions prior to September 11, 1998 were carried out at the 
consent of the DRC, and that following that point Uganda was acting in self-defense until 
July 10, 1999 with the conclusion of the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement, which Uganda 
argued also granted consent for the presence of Ugandan soldiers.531 
As discussed above, the ICJ acknowledged that, at the latest, the DRC had 
withdrawn consent for the presence of Ugandan troops within its territory during the 
Victoria Falls Summit on August 8, 1998. 
Uganda had asserted its claim of self-defense with reference to a document entitled 
“Position of the High Command on the Presence of the UPDF in the DRC.”532  That 
document established five bases for the claim of self-defense:  (1) To deny Sudan the 
opportunity to use DRC territory for operations against Uganda; (2) to neutralize anti-
Uganda opposition groups that received support from the DRC and Sudan; (3) to ensure 
that the instability in the eastern DRC did not spill over into Uganda; (4) to prevent the 
Interahamwe and FAR members from launching attacks into Uganda; and (5) to ensure 
that Uganda was in a position to resist invasions into its territories.533 
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(5) Belligerent Occupation 
 
The DRC asserted that Uganda had occupied its territory from August 7, 1998 until 
June 2, 2003, though the size of the territory occupied by Uganda had fluctuated throughout 
the conflict.534  The DRC argued that Uganda had established a new province in the eastern 
DRC, the Kibali-Ituri province, over which it appointed a deputy governor to administer 
the territory.535  The DRC asserted that at all times the Ugandan military exercised de facto 
control over the seized territory.536  Uganda, on the other hand, claimed that the small 
number of troops deployed in the DRC, their deployment being confined to strategic areas, 
and a prohibition of interference in local affairs proved that Uganda was not an occupying 
power.537  Further, Uganda asserted that it was the MLC and the RCD that exercised de 
facto control over the territory.538  Finally, Uganda claimed that the appointment of a 
governor was motivated by a desire to restore stability to the area, though the Ugandan 
military official who made the appointment was reprimanded for interfering in local 
affairs.539 
 
(6) Violations of Human Rights Law and International 
Humanitarian Law 
 
The DRC made numerous claims that Uganda had violated international human 
rights and humanitarian law: 
 
• Wide-scale massacres by the UPDF of Congolese civilians in the Ituri 
region, involving torture and inhumane and degrading treatment, and 
mass killings of civilians suspected of having aided anti-Uganda 
opposition groups; 
• The plundering of civilian property by the UPDF and the destruction of 
villages and private property as part of scorched earth tactics, notably in 
Kisangani in 1999 and 2000; 
• Forcibly recruiting Congolese children into the UPDF, including 
ideological and military indoctrination in 2000, particularly in the areas 
of Bunia, Beni, and Butembo; 
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• Failing to protect Congolese civilians during combat operations with 
other belligerents and the failure by the UPDF to distinguish between 
combatants and non-combatants, notably during the clashes between 
Rwandan and Ugandan forces in Kisangani in 1999 and 2000; 
• The participation and perpetuation of ethnic violence in Ituri by 
providing direct military support, training, and supplies to the Hema in 
their confrontations with the Lendu, resulting in thousands of civilian 
casualties; 
• Failing to prevent mass atrocities committed by ethnic groups in the 
Ituri region; and 
• Failing to enforce respect for human rights and international 
humanitarian law in occupied regions.540 
 
Uganda principally contested the evidence the DRC used, alleging the evidence 
was uncredible, partisan, or insufficient to prove the allegations.541  Uganda also claimed 
that it did not forcibly recruit Congolese children into its military, but that Uganda had 
rescued these children during conflicts between rebel opposition groups.542  Further, 
Uganda asserted that its troops were insufficient to control ethnic violence in the Ituri 
regions, “and that only an international force under United Nations auspices had any 
chance of doing so.”543  Finally, Uganda disputed that the ICJ had jurisdiction over events 
in Kisangani in June 2000 because Rwanda was not a participant in the proceedings.544  In 
any case, Uganda argued that the ICJ should not assert its jurisdiction over the matter “in 
order to safeguard the judicial function of the Court.”545  In response to Uganda’s final 
claims, the DRC argued that it requested the ICJ to make findings only on the legality of 
Uganda’s actions in the Kisangani area, and such findings would be independent of 
whether Rwanda or Uganda were responsible for initiating the hostilities that led to the 
violence.546 
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(7) Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources 
 
The DRC accused Uganda of several actions relating to the illegal exploitation of 
the DRC’s natural resources: 
 
• Taking “outright control of the entire economic and commercial system in 
the occupied areas, with almost the entire market in consumer goods being 
controlled by Ugandan companies and businessmen; 
• Hunting protected species; and 
• Encouraging the UPDF and rebel groups to exploit the DRC’s natural 
resources.547 
 
The DRC claimed that Uganda’s highest authorities were aware of these activities and the 
UPDF’s involvement, but actively encouraged the exploitations to finance the Ugandan 
military offensives.548  These actions, the DRC contended, violated the DRC’s sovereignty 
and the Congolese peoples’ sovereignty over the DRC’s natural resources.549  The DRC 
also argued that Uganda violated a “duty of vigilance” to ensure that its military forces, 
nationals, or groups controlled by Uganda did not engage in the illegal exploitation of the 
DRC’s natural resources.550  Additionally, the DRC argued that these actions violated 
Uganda’s responsibilities as an occupying power under international humanitarian law.551 
Uganda argued that the DRC had not provided reliable evidence to prove its 
allegations.552  Uganda also argued that the limited nature of its intervention in the DRC 
precluded it from occupying the DRC in order to exploit its natural resources, nor could 
Uganda exercise the effective economic control over the eastern DRC.553  Uganda also 
denied that it violated the Congolese peoples’ sovereignty over the DRC’s natural 
resources, as well as denying that Uganda had a duty of vigilance.554  Uganda further denied 
the DRC’s assertion that it failed to take action to prevent the illegal exploitation of natural 
resources.555  Finally, Uganda argued that it was not responsible for the acts of individuals 
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that may have exploited the DRC’s natural resources and that the DRC had never precisely 
alleged which acts should be imputed to Uganda to invoke its legal responsibility.556 
 
(8) Uganda’s First Counter-Claim 
 
In the first counter-claim, Uganda alleged that it had been the victim of military 
operations and destabilizing operations carried out by armed opposition groups operating 
in the eastern DRC, which included Sudanese forces.557  Uganda argued that the DRC and 
Zaire had supported the actions of these groups or at the least had tolerated the actions of 
those groups, violating the prohibition on the threat or use of force and the principle of 
non-intervention.558 
The DRC argued that the first counter-claim should be analyzed with respect to 
three time periods:  (1) The period of Zaire under Mobuto; (2) the period of the DRC under 
Kabila until August 2, 1998; and (3) the period after August 2, 1998, which was the date 
Uganda began its military attack on the DRC.559  The DRC argued that the claim, insofar 
as it related to the first period, was inadmissible because Uganda had “renounced its right 
to invoke the international responsibility of the DRC (Zaire at the time) in respect of acts 
dating back to that period.”560  In the alternative, the DRC argued that Uganda had failed 
to meet the required evidentiary threshold to prove its claim with respect to the first period, 
as well as denying having violated the duty of vigilance and supporting anti-Uganda 
groups.561 
As for the second period, the DRC argued that Uganda had failed to establish that 
the actions of anti-Uganda rebel groups could be imputed to the DRC and, in any case, that 
the DRC had engaged in planning, preparation, or attacks with those groups.562  The DRC 
also refuted Uganda’s allegation that the DRC had entered into a military alliance with the 
Sudan for the purpose of destabilizing Uganda.563 
With respect to the third period, the DRC asserted that Uganda had failed to 
establish that the DRC was involved in any military attacks against Uganda or that the DRC 
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had supported anti-Uganda rebels.564  In the alternative, the DRC argued that such actions 
would be justified by self-defense under the UN Charter.565 
 
(9) Uganda’s Second Counter-Claim 
 
In the second counter-claim, Uganda alleged that the DRC had conducted three 
separate attacks on the Ugandan embassy in Kinshasa, in August, September, and 
November 1998; confiscated Ugandan government property; and maltreated diplomats and 
other Ugandan nationals in the embassy.566  Uganda also claimed that 17 Ugandan 
diplomats and nationals were subjected to inhumane treatment by FAC forces at the Ndjili 
International Airport during their evacuation from the DRC on August 20, 1998.567  Uganda 
further alleged that the DRC had permitted West Nile Bank Front commander Taban Amin, 
the son of former Ugandan dictator Idi Amin, to occupy the Ugandan embassy in Kinshasa 
and establish it as his official headquarters.568  Uganda contended that these actions 
breached various provisions of the 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations as 
well as the “customary or general international law” relating to the minimum standards for 
the treatment of foreign nationals.569 
The DRC argued that the second counter-claim was procedurally inadmissible.570  
The DRC asserted that the ICJ could not entertain the claim because Uganda had failed to 
establish that the persons subjected to inhumane treatment were Ugandan nationals and 
that those persons had exhausted local remedies.571  The DRC also argued that Uganda had 
been unable to establish the factual and legal bases for its claim, denying that it had 
participated in the August 1998 attack on the Ugandan embassy in Kinshasa as well as the 
existence of attacks on that embassy in September and November 1998.572  Further, the 
DRC disputed that it had permitted Taban Amin to establish his headquarters in the 
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Ugandan embassy; that it had treated Ugandan nationals inhumanely at the Ndjili 
International Airport; and that it had expropriated Ugandan property.573 
Uganda challenged the DRC’s procedural claims, as well as arguing that the DRC 
owed an obligation to Uganda to not inhumanely treat its nationals in addition to the 
separate obligation owed to those persons to be treated humanely.574  Because this claim 
arose out of a state-state obligation, Uganda argued that it did not need to exhaust local 
remedies prior to bringing the claim to the ICJ.575 
 
iii. Judgment 
 
The ICJ concluded that Uganda did have the DRC’s consent to operate in the 
eastern DRC prior to August 1998.576  While the 1998 Protocol on Security Along the 
Common Border was a continuation of the authorization for Uganda’s military presence in 
the DRC, the real source of consent was when Kabila authorized Uganda’s military 
presence in the eastern DRC in 1997.577  The ICJ noted that Kabila’s July 28, 1998 official 
statement, which the DRC alleged ordered all foreign forces out of the DRC’s territory, 
was ambiguous as to whether it included Ugandan forces.578  Nevertheless, the ICJ 
determined that the DRC had definitively withdrawn its consent by the Victoria Falls 
Summit on August 8, 1998, when the DRC accused Rwanda and Uganda of invading its 
territory.579 
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The ICJ concluded that the DRC had failed to establish a factual basis for Uganda’s 
involvement in the attack on Kitona.580  It found the testimony of the DRC’s witnesses 
unreliable and that journalistic accounts of the event were not wholly consistent or 
concordant to support the allegations.581  Moreover, the ICJ noted that the DRC considered 
Rwanda to be the perpetrator of the attack on Kitona at the time of the attack.582 
The ICJ acknowledged that Uganda did not argue that its operations in the towns 
of Beni, Bunia, and Watsa were justified on self-defense and held that the operations were 
clearly beyond the scope of any alleged consent for border security.583  The ICJ considered 
the remainder of Ugandan military operations as a whole, reasoning that they would not be 
individual instances of self-defense if they were not collectively self-defense.584  The ICJ 
noted that the Ugandan High Command document itself did not accord with the 
international law of self-defense.585  The ICJ held that Uganda had failed to establish that 
the DRC had allowed Sudanese or anti-Uganda opposition groups to conduct operations 
against Uganda, noting that the DRC was entitled to grant permission to foreign nationals 
to assist it during the civil war period.586  The ICJ also found that Uganda had not presented 
credible evidence to prove that the DRC was involved, either directly or indirectly, in 
certain attacks against Uganda.587  The ICJ observed that the Ugandan High Command 
document did not assert that the DRC had perpetrated any attacks against Uganda—it 
largely focused on preventative justifications for Ugandan military operations.588  The ICJ 
thus concluded that Uganda’s actions were not justifiable on the basis of self-defense.589 
The ICJ rejected Uganda’s claim that the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement constituted 
“acceptance by all parties of Uganda’s justification for sending additional troops into the 
DRC between mid-September 1998 and mid-July 1999.”590  The ICJ also held that the 
Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement did not constitute acceptance for the presence of Ugandan 
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troops during the withdrawal periods the agreement established.591  On that basis, neither 
the Kampala Disengagement Plan, the Harare Disengagement Plan, nor the Luanda 
Agreement—all of which modified the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement—granted consent for 
the presence of Ugandan troops in the DRC’s territory.592  The ICJ also acknowledged that 
many of the UPDF’s operations exceeded the scope of common border security, which was 
the basis for the DRC’s consent to the presence of UPDF forces in the DRC prior to the 
Victoria Falls Summit.593 
The ICJ concluded that Uganda’s actions in the DRC violated the prohibition of the 
use or threat of force under article 2(4) of the UN Charter, calling the actions “grave 
violations.”594  The ICJ rejected the DRC’s assertion that Uganda had created or controlled 
the MLC so as to impute its conduct to Uganda, noting that the DRC had provided largely 
uncredible evidence to support its assertion.595  The ICJ did find, however, that Uganda’s 
support of the MLC and the ALC violated the principle of non-intervention and the 
prohibition of the use or threat of force.596 
The ICJ concluded that Uganda was any occupying power in Ituri on the basis of 
the appointment of a governor to administer the region.597  Because Uganda was an 
occupying power, international law required imputed responsibility to Uganda “for any 
acts [or omissions] of its military that violated its international obligations and for any lack 
of vigilance in preventing violations of human rights and international humanitarian law 
by other actors present in the occupied territory, including rebel groups acting on their own 
account.”598 
The ICJ rejected Uganda’s procedural challenge to the DRC’s allegations of 
Uganda’s actions in Kisangani during 2000, finding that Rwanda did not have to be a party 
to the case in order for the ICJ to make a finding on the legality of Uganda’s conduct.599  
Relying on various international reports that exhibited consistency in the presentation of 
facts and corroboration by other credible sources,600 the ICJ then concluded that 
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UPDF troops committed acts of killing and torture and other forms of 
inhumane treatment of the civilian population, destroyed villages and 
civilian buildings, failed to distinguish between civilian and military targets 
and to protect the civilian population in fighting with other combatants, 
incited ethnic conflict and took no steps to put an end to such conflicts, was 
involved in the training of child soldiers, and did not take measures to 
ensure respect for human rights and international humanitarian law in the 
occupied territories.601 
 
While the ICJ rejected the DRC’s assertion that Uganda had created a deliberate policy of 
terror on the basis of insufficient evidence, it did find that the UPDF’s actions were legally 
attributable to Uganda.602  As a result, the ICJ held that Uganda had violated international 
human rights law and international humanitarian law under customary international law 
and various binding international legal instruments.603 
The ICJ found that it did not have credible evidence to prove that Uganda had a 
policy of exploiting the DRC’s natural resources nor that the Ugandan military intervention 
was designed to exploit the DRC’s resources.604  Nevertheless, the ICJ did conclude that 
high-ranking Ugandan military officials and soldiers had exploited the DRC’s resources 
and that Uganda had not taken measures to prevent such exploitation.605  The ICJ rejected, 
however, the DRC’s assertion that the principle of sovereignty over natural resources 
extended to the specific situation of looting, pillage, and exploitation of resources by an 
intervening military.606  The ICJ held that “Uganda violated its duty of vigilance by not 
taking adequate measures to ensure that its military forces did not engage in the looting, 
plundering and exploitation of the DRC’s natural resources.”607  But, as the ICJ had already 
found that Uganda did not control rebel groups in the DRC, Uganda was not liable for their 
actions.608  Finally, the ICJ concluded that Uganda had violated its duties as an occupying 
power.609 
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The DRC had requested that, as a consequence of Uganda’s violations of 
international law, the ICJ should require Uganda to cease its internationally wrongful acts, 
to provide specific guarantees and assurances of non-repetition, to pay reparations for its 
violations, which would be determined at a later proceeding failing agreement on the nature 
of the reparations by the DRC and Uganda.610  The ICJ noted that the DRC had not 
presented any evidence that Uganda had continued to violate international law after June 
2, 2003, so the ICJ did not have to order Uganda to cease any internationally wrongful 
acts.611  The ICJ found that Uganda had already provided sufficient guarantees and 
assurances of non-repetition by assuming obligations concordant with non-repetition under 
the Tripartite Agreement on Regional Security in the Great Lakes, which was signed on 
October 26, 2004 by the DRC, Rwanda, and Uganda.612  Finally, the ICJ ordered that 
Uganda pay reparations for its violations of international law, which would be determined 
by the ICJ failing agreement between the DRC and Uganda.613  The ICJ also found that, 
based on its findings of violations following the ICJ’s issuance of provisional measures, 
that Uganda had violated the ICJ’s provisional measures.614 
The ICJ rejected Uganda’s first counter-claim in its entirety.615  The ICJ analyzed 
Uganda’s first counter-claim under the DRC’s proposed time-period framework, despite 
Uganda’s objections.616  The ICJ rejected the DRC’s assertion that Uganda had waived its 
right to assert violations of international law during Mobuto’s rule of Zaire,617 but 
concluded that Uganda had failed to prove that Zaire authorities had provided political or 
military support for specific attacks against Ugandan territory or that Zaire had violated a 
duty by failing to act against anti-Uganda groups.618  With respect to the second period, the 
ICJ found that Uganda had failed to prove that the DRC had provided actual support to 
anti-Uganda rebel groups.619  Finally, the ICJ concluded that the DRC was acting in self-
defense throughout the third period.620 
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The ICJ rejected the DRC’s procedural challenges to Uganda’s second counter-
claim.621  The ICJ also found that Uganda did not have to exhaust local remedies for its 
claim to be considered.622  The ICJ found, however, that Uganda did not demonstrate that 
the individuals at the Ndjili International Airport were Ugandan nationals, and so the ICJ 
found that claim inadmissible.623  The ICJ did find that Uganda had satisfactorily shown 
there were attacks on the Ugandan embassy in Kinshasa and that its diplomats had 
mistreated at the Ndjili International Airport.624  Finally, the ICJ determined that while the 
seizure of Ugandan property was unlawful, there was insufficient evidence to conclude that 
the DRC had expropriated that property in violation of the international law of 
expropriations.625  Nevertheless, the DRC had violated the 1961 Vienna Convention on 
Diplomatic Relations in seizing Uganda’s property.626  The ICJ thus found that the DRC 
owed reparations to Uganda for those violations.627 
 
V. Analysis 
 
a. Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and 
Against Nicaragua 
 
The United States was clearly the more powerful state in Nicaragua.  In 1988, the 
United States had a GDP of 5.253 trillion USD.628  Of that GDP, 5.58% was devoted to 
military expenditures.629  In the same year, Nicaragua’s GDP was 2.631 billion USD.630  
From the available data, Nicaragua devoted 4.002% of its GDP to military expenditures in 
1991, an all-time high.631 
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The United States’s actions following the Nicaragua judgment suggest that the ICJ 
and international law generally are subject to the interests of powerful states.632  Because 
the United States refused to participate in the proceedings on the merits, it appears that it 
effectively closed any avenue for compliance with a judgment on the merits.  Shortly after 
its communication to the ICJ that it would not participate in the proceedings on the merits, 
the United States issued a press release: 
 
On January 18 of [1985] we announced that the United States would 
no longer participate in the proceedings instituted against it by Nicaragua in 
the International Court of Justice.  Neither the rule of law nor the search for 
peace in Central America would have been served by further United States 
participation.  The objectives of the ICJ to which we subscribe -- the 
peaceful adjudication of international disputes -- were being subverted by 
the effort of Nicaragua and its Cuban and Soviet sponsors to use the Court 
as a political weapon.  Indeed, the Court itself has never seen fit to accept 
jurisdiction over any other political conflict involving open hostilities. 
This action does not signify any diminution of our traditional 
commitment to international law and to the International Court of Justice in 
performing its proper functions.  U.S. acceptance of the World Court’s 
jurisdiction under Article 36(1) of its Statute remains strong.  We are 
committed to the proposition that the jurisdiction of the Court comprises all 
cases which the parties refer to it and all matters that are appropriate for the 
Court to handle pursuant to the United Nations Charter or treaties and 
conventions in force.  We will continue to make use of the court to resolve 
disputes whenever appropriate and will encourage others to do likewise.633 
 
This statement reveals two important motivators behind the U.S. decision to not comply 
with the ICJ’s judgments in Nicaragua.  First, the statement persists in claiming that the 
United States was fully committed to the ICJ—when it agreed with the outcome.  Second, 
the statement reveals a piece of the context during which Nicaragua was decided:  The 
Cold War.  Given these components, it is not surprising that the United States continued 
funding the contras despite the ICJ judgment in Nicaragua. 
While Nicaragua attempted to persuade the Security Council to enforce the ICJ’s 
judgment, the United States continued to accuse Nicaragua and the ruling as being 
complicit in a propaganda war against the United States.634  Finally, the DRC, Ghana, 
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Madagascar, Trinidad and Tobago, and the United Arab Emirates presented a draft 
resolution to the Security Council calling for full compliance with the Nicaragua 
judgment.635  The United States defeated the draft resolution with its veto—it was the only 
state to vote against the draft resolution.636  In explaining the veto, Vernon Walters, the 
U.S. representative, stated: 
 
The United States has been compelled to vote against the present draft 
resolution for the simple reason that that draft resolution could not, and 
would not, contribute to the achievement of a peaceful and just settlement 
of the situation in Central America within the framework of international 
law and the Charter of the United Nations.  That question, and not the 27 
June decision of the International Court of Justice, is the real issue before 
this Council. . . .  In the view of the United States, the Court has asserted 
jurisdiction and competence over Nicaragua’s claims without any proper 
basis.  Moreover, the Court failed to give any meaningful significance to 
the multilateral treaty reservation or the very substantial evidence of 
Nicaraguan misbehaviour.  Many of the principles asserted by the Court to 
constitute customary international law have no basis in authority or reason. 
. . .  For the moment we would merely ask whether those members of the 
Council that have voted in favour of the present draft really believe it would 
have bolstered the Court as a judicial institution. . . .  In a word, the United 
States has voted against this draft resolution because it would have painted 
an inaccurate picture of the true situation in Central America, because it 
would not have contributed to a comprehensive and peaceful settlement of 
the problems in the regions, and because it would in fact have done a 
disservice to the international law and institutions that it purports to 
uphold.637 
 
A later attempt to pass another Security Council resolution calling for full compliance 
similarly failed as a result of the U.S. veto.638  Nevertheless, the General Assembly adopted 
a resolution calling for full compliance with the Nicaragua judgment on November 3, 
1986.639 
The failed attempt to pass two Security Council resolutions and the successful 
attempt to pass a General Assembly resolution allowed Nicaragua to politically leverage 
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other powerful states to condemn the United States’s actions.640  While the international 
pressure in and of itself did not cause the United States to cease its activities, the United 
States nevertheless felt the need to explain its veto on the Security Council resolutions.  
More significantly, the United States explained that its actions were still fully compliant 
with its own interpretation of international law.  Rather than deny the power of international 
law to require the United States to comply with the Nicaragua judgment, the United States 
argued that its actions were fully consistent with international law.  If the United States felt 
that international law lacked power, it likely would not have expressed itself in that manner. 
That the United States not only ignored the ICJ judgment but actively disobeyed it 
does not signify that Nicaragua is a failure for the purposes of this study.  In spite of the 
disobedience, U.S. domestic developments eventually led to de facto compliance with the 
terms of the ICJ judgment.  The shift from active disobedience to de facto compliance 
began with events surrounding the Iran-Contra affair.  The Iran-Contra affair began when 
Al-Shiraa, a Lebanese newspaper, revealed that the United States was conducting an arms-
for-hostages deal with Iran and diverting proceeds to the contras in an article published in 
November 1986.641  This revelation led to U.S. Attorney-General Edwin Meese to reveal 
the program to the American public on November 25, 1986.642  Within a week, Reagan 
issued an executive order to form a “President’s Special Review Board” to review activities 
of the National Security Council.643  The President’s Special Review Board, commonly 
known as the Tower Commission, issued its report on February 26, 1987.644  For the 
purposes of this report, the relevant finding was that U.S. executive agents had continued 
to fund Nicaraguan contras in spite of specific legislation that prohibited such funding.645  
It should be noted that the Iran-Contra affair began just under five months after the ICJ 
issued the Nicaragua judgment. 
The Iran-Contra affair sparked a domestic crisis within the United States.  The 
media prolifically covered the Iran-Contra affair.  Within the first four weeks of the 
scandal, The New York Times ran front-page stories covering the Iran-Contra affair on 
approximately 20% of its available front-page space.646  During the same period, CBS 
News devoted 25.4% of its total broadcast time to the Iran-Contra affair.647  On October 1, 
1986, Reagan’s Presidential Job Approval rating was 64% approving, 28% disapproving, 
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and 7% unsure.648  By December 4, 1986, the approval rating had fallen to 47% approving, 
43% disapproving, and 8% unsure.649  On February 27, 1987, the day after the Tower 
Commission issued its report, the approval rating stood at 40% approving, 52% 
disapproving, and 7% unsure.650  Following the Iran-Contra affair and the Tower 
Commission report, U.S. executive agents ceased sponsoring the contras.651 
The international situation changed following the Iran-Contra affair.  George H. W. 
Bush, Reagan’s Vice-President, became President in 1989.652  His Republican-nomination 
campaign was formed and influenced in the period following the Iran-Contra affair.653  
Additionally, Nicaragua underwent a regime change following a Sandinista defeat in 
Nicaraguan politics.654  Violeta Chamorro, a U.S.-backed candidate, became President in 
1990, and the United States announced a 500 million USD aid package would be given to 
Nicaragua.655  On September 12, 1991, Nicaragua informed the ICJ that it renounced all 
right of action in the proceedings and wished to discontinue them.656 
By 1991, the United States was fully compliant with the ICJ’s Nicaragua judgment.  
It had ceased funding and conducting military and paramilitary operations in Nicaragua 
and the parties had agreed to the form of the reparations.  The causal trigger for compliance 
with the substantive provisions of the judgment was the U.S. domestic situation.  Before 
proceeding with the analysis, it is important to recall Hathaway’s integrated theory of 
international law.  Per that theory, the effective enforcement of international law occurs at 
the domestic level regardless of whether the state has agreed to be bound to international 
instruments.  What was critical in this case was that the support of the contras violated not 
only international law, but domestic law.  The furor created by the Iran-Contra affair was 
a specific domestic reaction related to foreign affairs.  As a result of the violation of 
domestic law, the public generated domestic pressure that forced the United States to 
comply with the ICJ’s international judgment.  Such a reaction is the essence of 
Hathaway’s theory. 
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International pressures do not appear to have had any effect in coercing U.S. 
compliance with the ICJ judgment.  When the United States notified the ICJ that it would 
not continue in the proceedings, there was no decline in Reagan’s Presidential Job 
Approval rating—in fact, it increased from 61% approving to 63% approving in that 
timeframe.657  Similarly, there was no decline in the approval rating in the period 
immediately following the ICJ judgment.  While international pressures occurred at the 
same time as the revelation of the Iran-Contra affair, they should not be considered to have 
influenced the United States’s decision for two reasons.  First, international pressure for 
compliance existed at all times, but it was not until the Iran-Contra affair began that change 
began to occur.  Second, domestic approval ratings do not appear to have been susceptible 
to international disapproval. 
Another interesting component of Nicaragua is that the United States did not 
invoke the Connally Amendment to the ICJ’s jurisdiction, discussed above.658  Constanze 
Schulte speculated that the failure to invoke the Connally Amendment may have been the 
implausibility of asserting that military or paramilitary actions in a foreign state were 
purely domestic matters.659  The failure to invoke the Connally Amendment was 
particularly notable because the ICJ had upheld such a reservation to its jurisdiction in the 
1957 Certain Norwegian Loans case.660  It is possible that the United States did not believe 
that the ICJ would respect the invocation of the Connally Amendment, given the overall 
climate during Nicaragua.  Developing states were beginning to emerge and assert their 
rights more aggressively in the international arena.  Notably, the Certain Norwegian Loans 
case involved two European powers instead of a conflict between a developed and a 
developing state like in Nicaragua.  In any case, it is significant that the United States 
failed to argue the Connally Amendment as a bar to ICJ jurisdiction when the entire 
participation in Nicaragua was based on procedural challenges. 
Additionally, the ICJ noted, as it had previously done in the Corfu Channel case, 
that “[i]ntervention is perhaps still less admissible in the particular form it would take here; 
for from the nature of things, it would be reserved for the most powerful States, and might 
easily lead to perverting the administration of international justice itself.”661  While there 
is no doubt that powerful states, particularly the United States, have continued to intervene 
in the domestic affairs of other states, these interventions could possibly be justified by an 
emerging “responsibility to protect,” commonly referred to as “R2P.”662  Indeed, U.S. 
interventions post-Nicaragua have largely been on the stated basis of humanitarian 
concerns.  There remains, of course, the argument that any intervention on the basis of R2P 
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is nugatory and serves to mask geopolitical interests.663  Nevertheless, the humanitarian 
concerns underlying the intervention seem to differentiate post-Nicaragua U.S. 
interventions from the Nicaragua intervention itself.  Moreover, some scholars have argued 
that the presence of geopolitical interventions alongside humanitarian concerns do not 
vitiate the humanitarian justification for intervention.664  A modern-day comparison that 
highlights the distinction and significance of interventions with or without humanitarian 
concerns is the Russian seizure of Crimea on nationalistic (though allegedly humanitarian) 
grounds and the nascent U.S. intervention in Syria on humanitarian grounds arising from 
the Syrian government’s use of sarin gas against civilians.665 
It should be noted, however, that intervention on the basis of R2P appears to 
contradict an explicit finding in Nicaragua: 
 
[The Court] has to consider whether there might be indications of a practice 
illustrative of belief in a kind of general right for States to intervene, directly 
or indirectly, with or without armed force, in support of an internal 
opposition in another State, whose cause appeared particularly worthy by 
reason of the political and moral values with which it was identified.  For 
such a general right to come into existence would involve a fundamental 
modification of the customary law principle of non-intervention. . . .  In fact 
however the Court finds that States have not justified their conduct by 
reference to a new right of intervention or a new exception to the principle 
of its prohibition.666 
 
The ICJ rejected that an exception to the customary law principle of non-intervention is a 
request of an opposition movement in another state.667  Nonetheless, that finding was 
premised on U.S. interventions based on “the domestic policies of [the country being 
intervened in], its ideology, the level of its armaments, or the direction of its foreign 
policy.”668  Speaking in dicta, the ICJ noted that any assertion of humanitarian intervention 
did not comply with the United States’s assertion of collective self-defense.669  While the 
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ICJ came close to rejecting the concept of humanitarian intervention, it couched its 
language on the specific means by which the United States actually employed in Nicaragua 
to state that “the use of force could not be the appropriate method to monitor or ensure 
[respect for human rights in Nicaragua].”670 
It would be an error to extend that holding as a rejection of R2P, especially 
considering the Cold-War context of U.S. interventions and the prevalence of the domino 
theory among U.S. foreign affairs experts.  Intervention on the basis of R2P is thus distinct 
from the ICJ’s holding in Nicaragua, and conducting R2P-style interventions is not 
tantamount to non-compliance with Nicaragua.  It thus appears that the United States has 
sought to avoid repeating actions similar to its actions in Nicaragua—such behavior 
appears to indicate implicit compliance with the substantive terms of the Nicaragua 
decision. 
 
b. The Territorial Dispute 
 
Libya was clearly the more powerful state in The Territorial Dispute.  Libya’s GDP 
in 1994 was 28.608 billion USD.671  From the available data, Libya spent 4.078% of its 
GDP on its military.672  In 1994, Chad’s GDP was 1.18 billion USD.673  Its percentage of 
GDP spent on military expenditures was 1.878%.674 
Compliance with the ICJ’s judgment in The Territorial Dispute began almost 
immediately: 
 
Within weeks of the ICJ’s decision, Libya and Chad agreed to abide by it; 
in April 1994, they reached an agreement on the practicalities of the Libyan 
withdrawal, removal of mines, and demarcation of the border.  They called 
for the United Nations to send a team of monitors to observe the withdrawal.  
In May, the UN Security Council established the United Nations Aouzou 
Strip Observer Group for this purpose.  The team consisted of 15 military 
and civilian observes and cost the United Nations just over $67,000.  On 
May 30, in accordance with the withdrawal schedule previously agreed 
upon, Libya completed its withdrawal, and the United Nations certified the 
result.  Both governments consider the matter of the Strip’s territorial 
sovereignty closed.675 
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Immediate compliance, however, may have overshadowed an elaborate 
background of motivations underlying Libya’s decision to comply.  Libya was anxious to 
retain OAU approval, and thus its behavior was modified when the UN and France 
condemned Libya’s behavior in conjunction with OAU disapproval.676  Libya had also 
achieved “pariah status” following its refusal to hand over two of its nationals involved in 
a 1988 plane bombing over Lockerbie, Scotland and the resulting UN sanctions.677  But at 
the time of The Territorial Dispute, Libya had already won two cases before the ICJ, 
making it one of the most active developing states in using the ICJ forum.678  Libya likely 
felt confident in its ability to use the ICJ to reinforce its interests. 
The arguments that Libya presented to the ICJ were based on a non-Western 
interpretation to international law.679  In particular, Libya’s claim as successor to the 
Senoussi Order and its conception of dual sovereignty reflected Islamic political thought 
and interpretations.680  These arguments demonstrated the emergence of developing states 
from non-Western backgrounds onto the international law plane.  As several scholars 
asserted, “[t]he independence of these new states vastly changed the legal landscape, as 
they came to have a significant role in the development of international norms.  Their 
perspectives, molded by centuries of colonial domination, exerted a major influence on the 
process of law making and its outcomes.”681 
The ICJ in its judgment, however, did not address Libya’s claims based on non-
traditional interpretations of international law.  It approached the issue as a matter of treaty 
interpretation and was careful to base its conclusions on the results of that interpretive lens.  
Ultimately “[t]he judgment unequivocally endorsed the practices of the colonial past and 
reinforced colonial continuities by supporting the sanctity of European-created borders.”682  
Nevertheless, Michelle L. Burgis concluded that the very fact Libya argued its case on the 
basis of Islamic political thought and practice supports the notion that international law 
may be influenced by non-Western states.683 
There were thus at least two powerful motivators informing Libya’s decision of 
whether to comply with The Territorial Dispute judgment.  On the one hand, Libya desired 
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international acceptance by the UN and the OAU, which would occur if Libya complied 
with the ICJ judgment.  On the other hand, the ICJ had refused to address Libya’s anti-
colonial arguments regarding the acceptance of borders drawn by European powers.  This 
rejection potentially entailed a rejection of non-Western, developing states’ anti-colonial 
narrative in relating to the international system.  It should also be recalled that Libya had 
the support of the Soviet Union.  Had it chosen to reject the ICJ judgment, Libya would 
likely still have the support of a powerful international actor.  Moreover, given the 
sanctions and condemnation that it was already under, Libya was likely to have suffered 
relatively little by loss of prestige or the imposition of additional international sanctions.  
Moreover, many relevant actors suspected that Libya would not comply with the ICJ 
judgment.684  The Territorial Dispute judgment constituted a “total victory” for Chad.685  
Libya thus had powerful incentives directing it toward noncompliance with the judgment. 
Libya’s decision to comply with The Territorial Dispute judgment is therefore 
highly significant.  Not only did it choose to comply with a decision that overlooked the 
anti-colonial narrative driving Libya, it did so even when it would have still received 
international support from the Soviet Union.  Libya’s choice thus reflects an acceptance of 
international law over the option of noncompliance, which would have benefitted Libya 
more.  Ultimately, the “dispute was settled efficiently and rapidly in accordance with the 
ICJ judgment, demonstrating the greater importance of positive factors in this case, 
including the desire of both parties for a judicial settlement, the conclusion of a special 
agreement for that purposes, and the financial support available during the proceedings.”686 
 
c. Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo 
 
It was not quite as apparent whether Uganda or the DRC was more powerful.  
Uganda’s GDP in 2005 was 9.014 billion USD.687  It spent 2.404% of that GDP on military 
expenditures.688  The DRC’s GDP in 2005 was 11.964 billion USD.689  It spent 1.381% of 
that GDP on military expenditures.690  Quantitatively, Uganda spent 216.7 million USD on 
its military while the DRC expended 165.2 million USD on its military.  Thus it appears 
that Uganda was quantitatively more powerful than the DRC.  Additionally, the DRC’s 
relative instability must be considered, as well as its inability to control its eastern territory. 
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It may be hard to imagine that any success has emerged from the seemingly 
perpetually-troubled DRC.  As one author put it: 
 
To describe the Congo as a site of perpetual violence marked by recurring 
full-scale armed conflict and lost opportunities is to risk repeating—with no 
excuse—the trajectory paved by Conrad with the phrase ‘heart of darkness’, 
and thus to consolidate identities and histories that serve to perpetuate 
dominant images and structural prejudices.  Nevertheless it is difficult to 
speak of the Congo without reference to its violent history, not least because 
the carnage and gratuitous sexual violence which has become synonymous 
with the country continues unrelentingly to dominate the lives of its people 
to this day.691 
 
Indeed, violence and instability has continued in the DRC to the present.  In 2006, the DRC 
held its first democratic elections which resulted in violence in Kinshasa.692  The 2011 
elections were rife with accusations of fraud.693  Joseph Kabila, the son of Laurent-Désiré 
Kabila, prevailed in both elections.694  Ethnic violence persists throughout the eastern 
DRC.695 
It should be recalled, however, that Uganda withdrew its military forces from the 
DRC after the DRC had initiated the Armed Activities litigation, but prior to the ICJ’s 
judgment.  The withdrawal of Ugandan forces led the ICJ to find the DRC’s cessation 
claims were inapplicable.  It is difficult to argue that the withdrawal had nothing to do with 
the litigation before the ICJ.  In fact, Uganda continuously referred to the security 
challenges it faced throughout the proceeding.  While military realities may have 
compelled the Luanda Agreement, by which Uganda agreed to withdraw its forces that 
were not permitted to stay in the DRC, it is significant that military realities were expressed 
via an international legal document.  Had military realities been sufficient, in and of 
themselves, to compel Uganda to withdraw its forces, then the Luanda Agreement would 
have been superfluous.  If it is assumed that states vigilantly pursue their own interests, 
then it would have been to no states’ benefit to expend resources on an international treaty 
that accomplished nothing beyond what military realities accomplished. 
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Along with finding that Uganda had ceased violations of international law at the 
time of the Armed Activities judgment, the ICJ concluded that the Luanda Agreement 
entailed adequate assurances and guarantees of non-repetition.  The remedies that the DRC 
requested against Uganda were thus already satisfied by the time the ICJ issued its 
judgment, barring the request for reparations which is ostensibly continuing.  The DRC 
and Uganda both failed to agree to the exact nature of the reparations, so that aspect of the 
case is still before the ICJ.696  Nevertheless, the fact that the case is continuing is significant.  
Without respect for international law’s power, neither Uganda nor the DRC would likely 
expend the resources necessary to continue the litigation.  Additionally, Armed Activities 
is unique from Nicaragua and The Territorial Dispute in that both parties to the dispute 
received a judgment in their favor.  This distinction has some explanatory power.  Because 
both states are pursuing the litigation, that pursuit demonstrates that both states have 
considered that international law, as decided by the ICJ, has the ability to effectuate their 
interests against the other. 
 
d. Case Comparison 
 
The three cases each represent compliance against state interests to varying degrees.  
The Territorial Dispute is the clearest.  Libya acted directly against its interests by 
complying with the ICJ judgment immediately after its ruling.  Armed Activities represents 
a medium level of compliance.  While Uganda did not respect the ICJ’s provisional 
measures, it had already ceased violating international law by the time the ICJ issued its 
judgment.  Finally, Nicaragua represents the weakest form of compliance.  While initially 
the United States actively disobeyed the ICJ’s ruling, the United States was forced into 
compliance by its own domestic politics following the Iran-Contra affair and Nicaragua’s 
democratic regime change.  Furthermore, Nicaragua and the United States agreed to 
discontinue the proceedings on the matter of reparations owed to Nicaragua after the United 
States provided 500 million USD in aid. 
All three cases involved armed conflict.  While it was more apparent in Nicaragua 
and Armed Activities, the underlying events leading to The Territorial Dispute were very 
violent and involved state-state armed conflict.  Each case also involved challenges to state 
sovereignty.  These cases were chosen precisely because they involved armed conflict and 
challenges to state sovereignty.  The underlying rationale for the choice was that states 
would be more likely to disregard an unfavorable ICJ ruling in these types of situations.  
Where the military and sovereignty are challenged, a state has more incentive to pursue its 
self-interests at the expense of international law.  But these cases demonstrated that states 
are willing to comply with ICJ judgments at the expense of their immediate self-interests 
even in matters of vital concern to the states. 
But why are states willing to comply with unfavorable ICJ rulings when 
noncompliance would directly pursue self-interests in important matters?  A possible 
explanation is that international law has the power to legitimize and delegitimize a state’s 
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actions.  An example of this occurred in the events surrounding Nicaragua.  The United 
States’s refusal to comply with the ICJ judgment unleashed a flurry of activity condemning 
the action by states uninvolved in the dispute.  The United States twice had to use its veto 
in the Security Council in order to defeat draft resolutions calling for full compliance with 
the ICJ judgment.  In spite of U.S. efforts, the General Assembly passed a resolution calling 
for compliance.  Failure to adhere to an ICJ ruling thus carries high international transaction 
costs.  In this case, the United States is the exception that proves the rule.  Few states have 
the resources and political largesse to withstand such excoriation and pressure from other 
states.  It is hard to imagine that Libya or Uganda would have been able to fare as well as 
the United States in resisting concerted international pressure to comply with an ICJ 
judgment. 
International law’s power to legitimize or delegitimize a state’s actions should not 
be idly considered, if only for one reason:  States care about whether other states and their 
own domestic audiences perceive their actions as complying with international law.  For 
example, the United States was extremely careful to declare that its actions, though 
noncompliant with the Nicaragua judgment, were compliant with international law as a 
whole.697  By itself, that is a remarkable, if not laughable, claim.  The United States was 
distinctly departing from international law by refusing to recognize the ICJ’s holding 
regarding its own jurisdiction.  Yet it still expended resources arguing that its actions 
complied with international law as a whole.  The assertion that international law is “pure 
talk” to mask a state’s pursuit of its self-interests cannot explain the United States’s actions 
in Nicaragua.  The departure from international law in favor of the United States’s self-
interests was clear.  “Pure talk” could not mask it.  But the United States still engaged in 
dialogue with the international community about the Nicaragua decision in the language 
of international law—the realist understanding of international law fails to explain this 
case. 
A key point to observe is that, in these cases, compliance with international law has 
not suffered where international law confronts essential state interests, such as sovereignty 
or matters involving armed conflict.  This point is somewhat counterintuitive.  An outside 
observer, knowing that international law has weak enforcement measures, might assume 
that states would be more willing to comply with international law in matters of lesser 
concern but more likely to violate international law in matters involving vital state interests.  
In both The Territorial Dispute and Armed Activities, such an assumption proves false.  
Libya withdrew troops from the Aouzou strip and Uganda had already withdrawn its troops 
by the time of the ICJ judgment.  While the United States in Nicaragua pursued its own 
self-interests, it seems to be the exception that proves the rule.  It is key to note that the 
United States was in full compliance with the ICJ judgment within five years.  While other 
                                                          
697 The United States is, by no means, the only state to argue that its actions are compliant with international 
law.  During the invasion of Crimea, Russian President Vladimir Putin claimed that the annexation of Crimea 
complied with international law.  See Steven Lee Myers & Ellen Barry, Putin Reclaims Crimea for Russia 
and Bitterly Denounces the West, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 18, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/19/
world/europe/ukraine.html (“Certainly the sanctions imposed on Russia ahead of Tuesday’s steps did nothing 
to dissuade Mr. Putin, as he rushed to make a claim to Crimea that he argued conformed to international law 
and precedent.”). 
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factors may have strongly influenced the United States to change its position with respect 
to the substantive terms of the Nicaragua judgment, the integrated theory of international 
law provides a reasonable basis to conclude that domestic pressures caused the United 
States to fully comply.  In each of the three cases, therefore, the states complied with ICJ 
judgments, whether expressly or de facto, in spite of the judgments being disfavorable and 
involving vital state interests. 
 
VI. Conclusion 
 
Intervening factors may have motivated the states in Nicaragua, The Territorial 
Dispute, and Armed Activities to act as they did, but the power of international law itself 
was undoubtedly causal to a degree.  While it may not have been strong enough to influence 
compliance in and of itself, except perhaps in The Territorial Dispute, it is nonetheless 
obvious that it was a factor in each states’ decision about whether to comply with the ICJ 
judgment.  Moreover, intervening variables in this analysis are part and parcel to the power 
of international law as enforcement is often provided for by political means. 
The UN Charter itself acknowledges that the Security Council may enforce 
decisions of the ICJ when a party fails to comply with an ICJ judgment.698  While the 
Security Council has never enforced an ICJ judgment under the provision,699 that provision 
indicates that ICJ decisions were intended to be enforced, failing automatic compliance, by 
UN organs and other actors.700  Indeed, as have I argued before, other states can use their 
power to effectively coerce states to comply with international law standards.701  Further, 
Constanze Schulte argues that a focus on enforcement mechanisms does not fully grasp the 
power of international law to influence state behavior.702 
In spite of weak enforcement mechanisms, the ICJ has a general pattern of 
compliance.703  This pattern is likely the result of the impartiality of the ICJ and its 
production of well-reasoned and thorough opinions.  To increase compliance, the ICJ 
should continue to ensure that it remains impartial and that it issues decisions based on 
established principles of international law.  Failure to do so would delegitimize the ICJ as 
an institution.  The ICJ should also ensure that its judgments receive as much publicity as 
possible.  Increased publicity should grant domestic audiences the ability to hold their 
governments accountable to international law via domestic pressure.  The ICJ currently has 
a respectable website through which it publishes press releases regarding its proceedings 
                                                          
698 U.N. Charter art. 94(2). 
699 In Hindsight:  The Security Council and the International Court of Justice, SEC. COUNCIL REPORT (Dec. 
28, 2016), http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/monthly-forecast/2017-01/in_hindsight_the_security_
council_and_the_international_court_of_justice.php. 
700 See generally CONSTANZE SCHULTE, COMPLIANCE WITH DECISIONS OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF 
JUSTICE 36–80 (Philippe Sands et al. eds., 2004). 
701 See generally Christopher R. Marshall, Swaziland, the AGOA, and Convention 87:  A Case Study for the 
Trade Preference Program Enforcement Model, 52 TEX. INT’L L.J. 163 (2017). 
702 CONSTANZE SCHULTE, COMPLIANCE WITH DECISIONS OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE 37 
(Philippe Sands et al. eds., 2004). 
703 CONSTANZE SCHULTE, COMPLIANCE WITH DECISIONS OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE 271–75 
(Philippe Sands et al. eds., 2004). 
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in six languages:  French, English, Arabic, Chinese, Spanish, and Russian.704  Cases are 
readily available, as are the ICJ’s orders and the parties’ filings.  The ICJ could provide 
more translations of the documents it maintains.  For instance, the DRC’s filings in Armed 
Activities are only available in French. 
The purpose of this report was to demonstrate that international law has the power 
to modify a state’s behavior even when it conflicts with its immediate interests.  Only in 
Nicaragua did a state refuse to immediately modify its behavior, and the result was near 
universal condemnation and eventual de facto compliance.  The three cases demonstrate 
that international law’s power varies depending on the situation.  In The Territorial 
Dispute, international law’s power was at its highest.  It was dealing with non-Western 
states on an issue that, while connected to armed conflict, did not address violations of 
international humanitarian law.  In Armed Activities, international law’s power was 
middling.  While Uganda ceased violating international law prior to the judgment, it had 
disobeyed the ICJ’s provisional measures.  Likely, the relative scale of the violence and 
the involvement of regional and international bodies influenced, in part, Uganda’s 
behavior.  But the fact that both the DRC and Uganda have continued to pursue the ICJ 
litigation with respect to reparations indicates that both consider international law has the 
power to enforce reparations against the other or themselves.  Finally, Nicaragua 
represents the nadir of international law’s power.  The United States’s active disobedience 
was perhaps one of the greatest challenges to the ICJ’s relevance.  Nevertheless, Nicaragua 
is notable now because it is an outlier.  And it must not be forgotten that, in the immortal 
words of Louis Henkin, “almost all nations observe almost all principles of international 
law and almost all of their obligations almost all of the time.”705 
 
                                                          
704 See generally International Court of Justice, INT’L COURT OF JUSTICE, http://www.icj-cij.org/ (last visited 
May 3, 2017). 
705 LOUISE HENKIN, HOW NATIONS BEHAVE:  LAW AND FOREIGN POLICY 47 (1968). 
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